HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND CONTEMPORARY NATO IDENTITY: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE 2005 CASE STUDY

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Abstract

Shifting from the military and defense alliance to the political organization brought changes to NATO's traditional roles. The humanitarian field and actorness in humanitarian crises has been a field of interest for NATO ever since the 1990s. As this new NATO role has been constantly disputed, NATO is involved in framing humanitarian crises as NATO task making strategic changes, and changing public discourse in order to support that task. The aim of this paper is to explain how NATO framed humanitarian crises and its participation in the international response to them on the example of the Pakistani humanitarian crisis caused by the devastating earthquake in 2005. The paper focuses on three stages of the process: identifying the humanitarian crisis as a NATO task of cooperative security; presenting NATO's contribution to problem solving in the form of coordinating role and logistical support, and finally, explaining incentives for action which encompass a narrative of solidarity. The Pakistani 2005 crisis has paved the way for the development of this role of NATO, thus transforming its Cold War identity based on the role of a military and defense actor.

Key words: NATO, identity, framing humanitarian crises, Pakistan, national and international security.

ХУМАНИТАРНЕ КРИЗЕ И ЊИХОВ ЗНАЧАЈ ЗА САВРЕМЕНИ ИДЕНТИТЕТ НАТО-А: СЛУЧАЈ ЗЕМЉОТРЕСА У ПАКИСТАНУ 2005. ГОДИНЕ

Апстракт

Трансформација од одбрамбено-војног савеза до политичке организације довела је до промене традиционалних улога НАТО-а. Једно од области у којима се НАТО обрео од деведесетих година прошлог века је и учешће у решавању хуманитарних криза. Како је ова улога увек оспоравана НАТО-у, настојао је да

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стратешким изменама и јавним дискурсом уоквири хуманитарне кризе као једну од својих најважнијих постхладноратовских улога. Циљ овог рада је да, на примеру пакистанске хуманитарне кризе, изазване разорним земљотресом 2005. године, објасни на који начин је НАТО уоквирио ову хуманитарну кризу и учествовање у међународном одговору на њу. У раду је фокус стављен на три фазе овог процеса: идентификовање ове хуманитарне кризе као задатка сарадње у безбедности; представљање сопственог доприноса у решавању проблема у виду координаторске улоге и логистичке помоћи, и најзад, рационализацијом сопственог ангажовања и позивањем на сопидарност која лежи у основи вредносног система ове организације. Пакистанска криза 2005. отворила је пут развоју и продубљивањеу ове улоге НАТО-а, трансформишући на тај начин његов хладноратовски идентитет заснован на улози војног и одбрамбеног актера.

Кључне речи: НАТО, идентитет, уоквиривање, хуманитарне кризе, Пакистан, национална и међународна безбедност.

INTRODUCTION

The changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA denoted the beginning of a new era in international relations. These changes have particularly affected the fields of security and defense. The deterrence and defense role of NATO, directed mostly against military threats, was called into question. To ensure its survival, NATO has turned to a broader interpretation of the Washington Treaty seeking to prove that NATO's purpose goes beyond territorial defense and that it is a value-based security organization of all the North Atlantic peoples based on democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, NATO started a wide range of activities of interests of the Alliance as a whole or some of its members. Over time, these activities demanded for the adaptation of capabilities and the development of new procedures. Technologies that have been developed for military purposes for decades have been put to use in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, in the fight against piracy, against terrorism, etc. The necessity of NATO's adaptation to the new environment imposed another great challenge, and that is the issue of (re)building the Alliance's identity in the conditions of identity crisis. All the changes in strategic conceptions including goals, tasks and capabilities have led to the transformation of NATO's Cold War identity which was grounded in the role of a defense actor.

Given that the previous research mainly put their focus on reasons, directions and political implications of NATO's transformation (Ciuta, 2002; Cornish, 2004; Adler, 2008; Dinev Ivanov, 2011), this paper aims at explaining the transformation process itself, so the main question in the paper is how NATO framed humanitarian crises and its own role as an actor in resolving humanitarian crises after the Cold War, and what the implications of that process were for the transformation of the Alliance's identity.

Thus, the paper tackles the framing of humanitarian crises by NATO. This is the process that led to the creation of a completely new role for NATO and transformed its role identity. Since the framing process is explained from a dramaturgical perspective, this paper will focus on how certain ideas and meanings about a specific segment of reality are created through the discourse of NATO officials and how they shape NATO practices that are becoming part of its identity.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it is theoretical, and it consists of furthering the concept of dramaturgical action to issues beyond microsociology, international relations and international security issues, and to interaction in a broader context than "face to face". It theorizes dramaturgical action as a virtual interaction with the audience in the form of carefully selected content that is posted on the official website and other communication platforms of NATO. This corresponds to Goffman's concept of the front stage on which the actor engages in the presentation of self in front of others. The creation of certain beliefs, impressions and notions, as well as face-saving and staying in the role is done by addressing the audience not only face to face, but in the virtual world. The fact that Goffman's microsociological approach implied individuals as actors is not an obstacle to applying his theory to organizations, because there are individuals who speak on its behalf, such as the NATO Secretary General, the NATO Spokesperson, the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, etc. The second contribution of the paper is analytical, and it consists of positioning NATO in the global security architecture, because thanks to the process of identifying humanitarian crises as a NATO task, NATO not only transformed its identity, but also expanded the sphere of action from the regional to the global level.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The theoretical framework of this research relies on Erving Goffman's theory of dramaturgical action, and especially on his concept of framing. The theory of dramaturgical action conceptualizes actors as "performers engaged in manipulative presentations of self and framing who are, at the same time, constrained by the script and the consistency requirement of their roles" (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 417). According to Entman, to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman, 1993: 52). The issues are framed through communication, when the text communicated to the public has the strength to create political power. Framing is the process through which identities and interests of the communicator are projected onto the targeted public.

Goffman defines a frame as a principle or set of principles that make sense out of events and organize human experience (Goffman, 1974: 10)[1]. Frames are conceptualized also as mental structures that shape the way we see the world (Lakoff, 2004). In the political realm, our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies, which means that every change of frame is social change at the same time (Ibid). The basic form of the frame is the primary frame, which is an interpretative scheme for interpreting, giving meaning and sense to information on the basis of which actors process and classify new information (Goffman, 1974: 21). The primary frameworks are schemes that rely on tradition, culture, beliefs, mythology and the popular culture of the society to which they belong. In order to change the perception of an object, event, actor, etc., it is necessary to influence the primary framework by which the meaning of those objects, events, actors is interpreted. The possibility for NATO's identity transformation therefore arose from the fact that primary frameworks can be influenced and changed. Transformation can be conducted either through fabrications (misleading participants about what is happening in a given situation) or through a keying, which was the case in NATO's transformation (actors are fully aware of what is happening in a given situation). Keying means that certain activity that is already meaningful for the audience through the lenses of the primary frameworks changes into something that is modeled after that activity, but the participants view it as something completely different. The types of keys most commonly used in society are dramatization, competitions, ceremonies, technical re-doings such as exercises and rehearsals, and re-founding activities, such as charity, re-education, etc. (Goffman, 1974: 48–74). Whatever type of key is used, what they all have in common is that they have a strategic purpose, and they are used in a planned, focused way, with a clear initiative and a defined goal that is planned to be achieved by it.

As framing is an activity of creating meanings, actors attribute meaning to events and conditions and interpret them in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988: 198). Drawing on Erving Goffman's, Snow and Benford suggested three core framing tasks: diagnosis, prognosis and motivation. More specifically, these tasks include: the diagnosis of some particular aspect of social life as problematic and in need of change; the proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and finally, a rationale for action, including motives and incentives for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action (Snow & Benford, 1988: 199).

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[1] Goffman especially emphasizes that his work is about the organization and structuring of experience, not about the organization of social life.

In order for a certain performance to be created and a certain definition of the situation imposed, it is necessary for the framing efforts to be successful. How successful framing efforts would be depends on the four types of constraints that determine the mobilizing potential of framing (Snow & Benford, 1988): the first are the robustness, completeness and thoroughness of the framing effort; the second is the internal structure of a larger belief system; the third type is the relevance of the framework for the participants: how much the framework resonates within the personal experience of the participants and the events around them; the fourth type is called "cycles of protest" and refers to whether the framework is part of a broader, social process taking place on regional or world stage. For framing, as well as for the entire self-presentation, the consistency and fidelity of the actors to a predetermined definition of the situation that requires corrective action is of the highest importance.

The main sources of data for this research were official speeches, spokesmen statements and press briefings. These documents were obtained through the on-line database of this organization available at the official website. In analyzing these documents, I relied principally on the method of discourse analysis, because it was most suitable to explain the way discourses create meanings and representations, and how those meanings and representations affect social practices that result from them and eventually influence the definition of what/who someone is. Basic discourses on NATO's specific position in the humanitarian field and NATO's role in the network of humanitarian actors have been identified. In addition, the case study method of the 2005 Pakistani earthquake is introduced in order to show the process of framing humanitarian operations within NATO on a practical example.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS CAUSED BY THE 2005 EARTHQUAKE IN PAKISTAN

NATO's engagement with crisis management has been a trend since the 1990s and is mostly linked to human caused crises. But, NATO has also been engaged in over sixty natural disaster relief operations. The earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 is one of the biggest natural disasters that NATO has been engaged in so far considering the duration and the consequences of the disaster. This operation might be regarded as a milestone (in addition to the catastrophe caused by Hurricane Katrina in the USA, which occurred the same year), for building and consolidating NATO's role in humanitarian crises caused by natural disasters.

Opposite to the controversial humanitarian action of NATO in complex crises, international actors in the humanitarian field have recognized that military actors play a significant role in responding to natural disasters. They evaluate cooperation in this area as a positive experience

facilitated by the Oslo Guidelines that stipulate that military assistance and funds in response to disasters can be provided only at the request or with the consent of the recipient state and on the basis of a request for international assistance (Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief, 2007: 13). The leaders of the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) consider that the role of the military is the most important in situations such as the earthquake crisis in Pakistan, because "only the military has the fastest means of moving the maximum amount of supplies... and therefore it is necessary to maintain communication with military actors" (UNDAC 25 - South Asia Earthquake, 2005).

In order to better understand how NATO found itself in the middle of the international response to the crisis, it is necessary to understand the context of the crisis. More specifically, on October 8th 2005, at 8.50am, local time, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the city of Muzafarabad, a little more than a hundred kilometers north of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. According to NATO sources, the total area affected by the earthquake was 30,000 square meters, the earthquake death toll was estimated at 87,000 with about three million left homeless (Pakistan earthquake relief operation, 2010).

The earthquake epicenter was located in the politically unstable region of Kashmir, known for its historic conflict between Hindus (after Pakistan's independence mostly settled in India) and Muslims (concentrated in Pakistan and Bangladesh), which persisted as an international problem even after the demarcation that allowed the division of Kashmir into the Indian governed part and the Pakistani governed part. Factors that made this crisis even more difficult were the multidimensional poverty and difficult living conditions of people in rural areas, harsh mountain conditions with low temperatures and landslides (Ahmed, 2018).

The first steps to reduce the consequences of the earthquake were taken voluntarily by locals, followed by the activities of the Pakistani military forces, who were still strongly relied on by the civilians (Phister et al., 2009: 9). The Pakistani military relief and rescue operation was, according to civilians, too slow and uncoordinated (Abbas, 2005). Immediately after the earthquake, the President of Pakistan emphasized the harshness of the crisis making the public aware that Pakistan would not be able to face it on its own, and sent an official request for help to NATO on October 10th 2005. The North Atlantic Council approved the request the very next day and organized a response to the catastrophe on October 13. The additional request for assistance were received by NATO on October 13 from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A significant role in resolving this disaster was played by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) which, together with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA), coordinated all the assistance coming from either member states or partner countries. A total of 42 countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council participated in the NATO operation to provide assistance to Pakistan. NATO ended the operation by February 1st 2006.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE AS A COOPERATIVE SECURITY TASK

NATO framed its engagement in the Pakistan earthquake crisis as an integral part of cooperative security, which is one of the three most important strategic tasks identified by the latest strategic concept. The special emphasis was made regarding the success of a partnership-based approach in international crisis management and the importance of the military as an actor in international humanitarian crises. The two most prominent discourses used in framing this humanitarian crisis as a NATO task are:

- The Pakistan crisis caused by the earthquake is a cooperative security task that NATO tackles in international humanitarian crises;
- The Pakistan crisis caused by the earthquake is a task for NATO through which it provides a contribution to the international order based on common values.

NATO explained the need for cooperation through a comprehensive approach in crisis management, which implies that NATO contributes with resources and capacities that other military or non-military actors do not have at their disposal and at all times when additional assistance is needed by those who request it:

> Pakistani government, a few days after the earthquake, came to NATO, requested formally through a letter to the Secretary General NATO's assistance as part of the overall international effort in support of the Pakistani government and of course the support of the UN, with a very precise list of areas where Pakistan could use as much international support as possible. Of course, in the circumstances, NATO could do nothing else but to lend its hand to the overall international effort. And the Alliance has done so. (Speech Briefing on current issues by the NATO Spokesman, NATO HQ, 2005)

A NATO spokesman pointed out that, in fact, through cooperation, actors involved in resolving the crisis are complementing each other and filling in the gaps that can potentially occur when actors act independently. On the example of the Russian cargo plane, which was leased with funds coming from one NATO country and which, for the purposes of the UN, transported a donation of another country to Pakistan, Antonov tried to explain that only cooperation can help achieve goals and fulfill NATO's tasks. He explained the role of a military actor in such crises as follows:

> I would say that NATO has done a lot. It has done it very quickly. And continues to do more. So, in fact, I think this is a good news story for NATO and the airlift of UNHCR supplies, for example, is a good example of NATO doing a significant amount of airlift in close cooperation with the UN. I dare say this is probably the most extensive cooperation NATO has had with the UNHCR in the history of either organizations, and that's a good thing. (Press briefing by NATO Spokesman on NATO's assistance to Pakistan, NATO HQ, 2005)

NATO, as the driving force of the international order based on values, committed itself to the protection of it. World's global challenges that pose a threat to values around which NATO is gathered are a legitimate reason for NATO to intervene and assist in any part of the world because there is a strong belief that this promotes and preserves the stability of the NATO's very own community. NATO's posture is that contemporary global security challenges cannot be addressed by a passive-reactive approach and by refraining from action, but only by the strategy of engagement, including multi-dimensional responses and partnership, with a strategy of action that must be firmly based on values (Addressing Global Insecurity, 2005). Therefore, the Secretary General sees the role of NATO in humanitarian operations like these in the future, with an emphasis on the specific role of military actors in the humanitarian field:

> NATO is not a humanitarian organisation, nor should it become one. But if we are asked to help, be it by the United Nations and the African Union, or by the Pakistani Government, and if we have the means to help, then we cannot ignore such a plea. I see this as another contribution to an international order that is based on values. NATO's operations are one important part of our values-based security policy. But they are not the only one. Because the best way to safeguard our values is by nourishing them – by upholding our values at home, and advocating them abroad. By believing in the power of open, democratic systems and liberal economic systems. By encouraging other countries – such as your neighbors to the East – to open up their societies too. And by lending them advice and assistance if they so request. (NATO: Defending Values and Security, 2006; Speech by the Deputy Secretary General, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo at the Law Faculty, University of Zagreb, 2006)

For NATO, its role in the 2005 Pakistan crisis is a partnership and cooperation concept in practice. Finally, this operation represents more than just a short-term task for NATO, taking into account the long-term interest in developing good bilateral relations with Pakistan, primarily in the field of counter-terrorism. During the crisis, NATO simultaneously led the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and it was extremely important to strengthen the relationship with Pakistan as an ally in the fight against the Taliban.

The post-earthquake humanitarian operation opened some possibilities for NATO to increase the trust among the Pakistani people and thus

make its presence in the neighborhood of Afghanistan more certain and effective. Despite the turbulence in NATO-US-Pakistan-Taliban relations, this was a significant step forward for NATO's strategic goals in that part of the world.

So, in addition to the value-based motivation for NATO to engage at the request from Pakistan, the geopolitical motivation is certainly of great importance. This was openly stated by a NATO spokesman during one of the daily press briefings, just shortly before the end of the operation in Pakistan:

> The relationship that we've built with the Pakistan government, I think, will be a good relationship because we do have, as you point out, an important operation right next door, and moving closer to the Pakistani border. There is an issue of what we call lines of communication, and that is a transit, where we might need or wish to support or supply the ISAF mission most effectively or efficiently through Pakistan. So, there are discussions underway between NATO and the government of Pakistan to formalize an arrangement for transit where necessary. This is of course something that would need to be worked out, and it is very much up to the Pakistani government how it wishes to approach this. But, certainly it would be valuable from a technical point of view for NATO to have that kind of agreement between NATO and the Pakistani government. (Background briefing by the NATO Spokesman, NATO HQ, 2006)

After this first framing task, which includes identifying the problem and putting it in a recognizable framework, there comes the second, and in this case the most important task. It points out a key advantage of NATO over other actors in such crises and, which is interesting, obtain at the same time certain mobilization potential that is particularly emphasized in the third framing task.

NATO CAPABILITIES IN RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: COORDINATION AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Although NATO is hardly perceived as a humanitarian relief actor in the public opinion, humanitarian crises require the deployment of a large number of forces and capacities, including even military equipment and established crisis management procedures, which makes NATO relevant in this field (Keeping NATO relevant: A shareholders' report, 2005). NATO forces, originally trained for war and deterrence, have been transformed into rapid reaction forces, and the motives behind that transformation are also seen in possibility to justify the high operational costs of such forces that would otherwise be useless and dysfunctional without such engagements (Americo dos Reis, 2018: 74).

Addressing the Pakistan earthquake crisis, the Secretary General emphasized that "no one doubts that NATO is doing a crucially important

job there" (Keeping NATO relevant: A shareholders' report, 2005). The NATO contribution to ending the crisis was explained through two prominent discourses:

- NATO's contribution to resolving a humanitarian crisis consists in the coordination of the international response to the humanitarian crisis and logistic assistance;
- NATO's contribution to resolving the humanitarian crisis consists in the deployment of NATO troops with the task of providing assistance to civilians and rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure.

The operation in Pakistan was formally launched with the approval of the North Atlantic Council on 11th October 2005, and immediately after that decision an Operations Plan (OPLAN 10305) was agreed on. OPLAN 10305 spelled out a two-staged approach to NATO's support to the humanitarian relief operation (The EADRCC Final Situation Report No. 23 on Earthquake Pakistan, OPS (EADRCC) (2006) 0005, 2006). The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) acting as a single point of contact was tasked to coordinate all offers from NATO and Partner nations that requested NATO transportation assistance.

NATO listed five elements on which the short-term post-earthquake relief mission in Pakistan was based, which was aimed at creating the conditions for other actors to begin long-term aid and reconstruction missions: the coordination of donations from NATO and Partner countries; the air bridge from Turkey and Germany for the transport of relief goods to Pakistan; five helicopters located in the area affected by the earthquake for the transport of supplies to remote mountain villages and the evacuation of victims; engineer and medical support operating in the area around Bagh (Pakistan earthquake relief operation, 2010).

The first phase of the operation was focused on the coordination and airlift of emergency humanitarian aid and funds donated by NATO members and partner countries. NATO air bridge was used by other countries, as well as the UN. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was in charge of the operational implementation of the Plan through the SHAPE Allied Movement Coordination Center (AMCC). Rammstein Air Base was used as a central point of the NATO air bridge for sending humanitarian aid. On October 19th 2005, NATO also opened an air bridge at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey in order to transport supplies donated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Pakistan. During the operation, 164 NATO-controlled or coordinated relief flights delivering more than 3.224 tons of relief goods took place. The NATO relief flights constituted the largest single contribution to the airlift relief effort, according to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry Note Verbale No. 1/12/1/2005-ECC, dated 1st December 2005 (The EADRCC Final Situation Report No. 23 on Earthquake Pakistan, 2006). In addition,

NATO provided as many as 130 flights to transport 2,245 tons of funds in support of the United Nations (Ibid).

The second phase of the operation followed the request from the Pakistani authorities on 17th October 2005 to consider sending NATO troops to respond to provide assistance on the ground. The North Atlantic Council decided on 21st October to deploy engineers and medical personnel from the NATO forces in the endangered areas in Pakistan, in order to respond for a maximum period of ninety days. The insistence on the time frame in this case is explained by the fact that NATO wanted to demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that NATO had no intention of staying in the region and was not using the deployment to cover up military encroachment into Pakistan (Wiharta et al., 2008: 113).

During the operation, some 1,000 engineers and supporting staff, as well as 200 medical personnel, worked in Pakistan (Pakistan earthquake relief operation, 2010). In addition to work on rebuilding the infrastructure, the engineers are credited with supporting the Pakistani Army in Operation Winter Race, by constructing 110 multi-purpose shelters for the population living in the mountains (Ibid). Already by November 9th, NATO announced the opening of a completed hospital equipped for complex surgical procedures. The same day, NATO set up the so-called fuel farms, oil depots where civilian and military helicopters were replenished to provide assistance in Pakistan (upon the request of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 30 October 2005 (EADRCC Situation Report No. 14, Earthquake Pakistan, 2005)).

During the second phase, the need for transporting humanitarian aid to the vulnerable did not cease, so on October 27th 2005, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Tariq Osman Hyder addressed a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, asking for further assistance, explaining that "only NATO could provide continued airlift, funds, logistic and airspace management, mobile fuel tanks, spare parts for helicopters and tactical aircraft, command and control, winterized tents and sleeping bags" (Pakistan and UNHCR ask for further NATO assistance, 2005).

In addition to the mentioned material contributions, the successful framing included the final step, the one concerning the rationalization of NATO's participation in the response to the crisis. This was a very important step, particularly if we take into account the numerous criticisms leveled at NATO.

RATIONALIZATION OF NATO ENGAGEMENT: THE NARRATIVE OF SOLIDARITY

The rationale for NATO's action and development of motivational frames in the Pakistan earthquake crisis was a far easier task than that of certain man-made crises, because, first of all, there were no disputes over

the legality of the action, which increased the level of trust between addressees and the providers of help. That is why the rationale for participation is framed in terms of solidarity incentives for action and is directed not only at the Pakistani public, but mostly to the Euro-Atlantic public. The solidarity narrative of NATO is created in order to function as a frame alignment with broader public's beliefs, values and patterns of experience. The most prominent discourse in the function of the legitimization and rationalization of NATO's action in the Pakistani humanitarian earthquake crisis is:

- ▪ Participation in resolving the Pakistani humanitarian crisis caused by the earthquake is an act of solidarity and support to the partner country that requested for help.

The narrative of solidarity has the function of explaining to the public why this organization was part of the partnership's response to the crisis, despite, as NATO officials themselves pointed out ”the distance to Pakistan and the need to transport not just relief supplies but also heavy equipment and helicopters and despite costs of millions and millions of dollars” (NATO faces challenge in Pakistan earthquake response, 2005).[2] NATO stressed that it had responded to this call as an act of support to the partnership with the country from which the request came:

> We are happy that we could do our part this time in answering positively a request made by the Pakistani authorities. (News conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministerial Session, NATO HQ, 2005)

The statements of NATO officials included also news about helping civilians, earthquake victims (Weekly press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, 2008)[3], so the distinction has to be made between the Pakistani government (solidarity) and Pakistani people (support) as the addressees of the NATO message. In one of the latest reports on the Pakistan crisis, the NATO spokesman conjoins solidarity and support, emphasizing that NATO gave a hand as a “community of nations, glad to be able to answer the call from the UN, from the Pakistani government, to help where we could the Pakistani people, in what was obviously an hour of need” (Video Background Briefing by the NATO Spokesman, 2006).

Therefore, a very important fact in the process of motivational framing, either for Pakistani or for the Euro-Atlantic audience, is that

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[2] Statement by John M. Koenig, the then Deputy Chief of the US Mission to NATO
[3] See also: News conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministerial Session, 2005; Statement by the Secretary General on the end of the NATO mission in Pakistan, Press Release (2006)009, 2006.

NATO did not intervene unilaterally, but at the request of the Pakistani government as a host country, as well as at the request of the UN. NATO clearly points out that the legitimacy and legality of actions are drawn from these official requests. In addition to them, there is another favorable circumstance that NATO finds important and that is the relationship of trust with the Pakistani people. According to NATO officials, the trust of the Pakistani people was gained during the operation itself, although at first glance it did not seem like a simple challenge. Andrew Walton, the Commander of NATO's Disaster Relief team in Pakistan, explained the challenges NATO faced with in Pakistan as follows:

> One of the first things we had to do is to explain to the Pakistani population who NATO is, what we are. Although the government of Pakistan invited NATO it was pretty obvious that the vast majority of the population did not understand what NATO does, how it does it. And so they were a little weary of us, first, but we quickly overcame that by frankly explaining what we do and letting them see what we were doing. So that was the first challenge if you like. But it was a fairly small challenge. (Video interview with Andrew Walton, NATO HQ, 2006)

Referring to sources directly from the Pakistani people, but also from the Pakistani media, Walton concluded that the people were left with the impression of NATO as a "force of good - a capable, professional, and trustworthy organization" and assessed it as a satisfying result (Video interview with Andrew Walton, NATO HQ, 2006).

Another important fact that facilitated the motivational framing in this operation is the absence of overlapping roles, which means that NATO had not practiced both the military and humanitarian role at the same area and avoided thus to be in a complicated and highly unpopular situation to solve humanitarian consequences caused by its own military actions. Previous research showed that when a military force responds to a natural disaster without using force, there is no need to fear a connection between humanitarian assistance and military strategic goals. In these circumstances, military motivations are "eminently humanitarian and are strictly related to the provision of expertise and logistics to civilian agencies" (Americo dos Reis, 2018: 81; see also Kenyon Lischer, 2007: 103), which implies that they should not be called into question when it comes to disaster response.

Resolving the crisis in Pakistan is considered to have had a longer-term effect on NATO's diplomatic relations with this country and on the favorable conditions for NATO's overall presence in that part of the world, but it is also considered an investment in the future of NATO itself. The Secretary General perceives the response to the Pakistani crisis as a model of a well-done task that has a positive effect on a more stable and just global order, thus making a long-term investment in NATO's

own security (Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Grandes conferences catholiques, 2007). Putting the defense of the values of NATO in connection with strategic interests, and putting efforts to make those values universal, another step was made towards legitimizing NATO's global path, and thus all the operations it includes, including this one from Pakistan 2005.

Given the explanation of the nature of NATO's action in Pakistan, it is accurate to define it as humanitarian assistance, because NATO, formally, assisted the UN. In practice, this can be called into question, and it may be debated whether EADRCC overlaid UN OCHA in coordination role during the crisis. However, since dramaturgical theory is not interested in moral or normative issues behind the performance, but rather in the quality of performance itself, the aim of this paper was to evaluate the successfulness of self-presentation and consistency of framing efforts in order to explain how NATO discursively created the role of actor in the humanitarian field and how it eventually affected the identity change. Questions and dilemmas like whether NATO met the moral standards of this role, whether it got out of it and how consistent it was in the limitations and scope of its role, has to some extent been a subject of previous research, and may certainly be the subject of some future ones.

DISCUSSION

NATO is an organization that emphasizes the adaptability to change as its value, and that is the mainstay of its survival and duration. The greatest impact on NATO's transformation is made by the end of the Cold War, but the transformation is an ongoing process. NATO has been continuously strategically transforming, adapting its goals, tasks and modernizing forces and means in accordance to the new needs. During the first few decades of its existence, NATO built a strong identity based on the most important Cold War role: deterrence and defense. Today, that identity is based on several roles that NATO has taken on in addition to deterrence and defense. NATO's transformation and adaptation are an integral part of NATO's identity and inseparable from "Alliance's ability to provide security well into the future" (De Hoop Scheffer, 2005: 3), and the roles NATO takes on become part of its identity.

The process of identity transformation is a complex process that depends on both the actor and the audience that interacts with them. In that regard, NATO strived to frame every new crisis-management operation in a certain way so the public would be informed why NATO engaged in that operation, under what conditions, what was the contribution it made and why it was the "game changer" both for NATO and other actors. Through this process of communicating its role in the crisis situation, NATO strengthened its position in the humanitarian field, and this

made it recognizable in subsequent operations as an actor that can make a significant contribution to other, traditionally present actors, in the field of humanitarian and other crisis-management operations. In the process of the narrative construction of identity, NATO found its main stronghold in its role of the crisis manager, and on the example of the crisis caused by the earthquake in Pakistan, it was explained how the process of creating the role went through.

As Williams and Neumann, speaking of the narrative transformation of NATO identity in their concluding remarks, leave room for answering the question of "why specific discourses prevail over others and how this is accomplished" (Williams, Neumann, 2000: 384), this paper contributes to the explanation of how and why certain discourses become significant for identity shaping. The paper explains the process of discursive positioning of NATO as an actor in the humanitarian field, in which NATO receives feedback in the form of support from other relevant actors in that field.

Feedback or public reaction, as an important part of the framing process, is analyzed indirectly, based on formal indicators, such as the official requests for NATO assistance from other actors, mainly humanitarian actors from the UN system. The analysis would be more complete by directly examining the attitudes of humanitarian actors about how they see NATO today and whether they perceive it as an actor in the humanitarian field, which leaves room for deepening this research.

The dramaturgical perspective and framing proved to be an exceptional framework for understanding the process through which the transformation takes place, because the process is crucial to understand how certain segments of reality pass through certain frames known to the public in order to influence their perception and interpretation of those segments. Through discourse, NATO has re-framed its place in the modern security architecture and positioned itself as a relevant actor in the field of resolving humanitarian crises. The application of framing as a dramaturgical model taken from sociology has already found its place in the field of international relations and security, but considering that the theory has been tested in a microsociological environment, the disadvantage of its application is that actors are not always in direct "face to face" interaction. Besides, the audience must be precisely defined in order to define indicators and measure the framing effect in that particular audience. In addition to that, framing aims at managing the impressions of the audience, and therefore is deemed to be, and criticized of being, an instrument of agenda-setting, making space for the implementation of those practices that are related to a particular type of identity of the actors. Finally, the application of the theory of dramaturgical action as a theoretical framework is, as Schimmelfennig concluded, adequate only in conditions when there is an international community, which is an international system

characterized by a common cultural ethos and high intensity of interaction (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 434). In such a system that has reached the level of community, actors are obligated to behave in accordance with constitutive values and norms in order to preserve their image as good members of that community, and therefore use framing and other self-presentation techniques explained by the dramaturgical action theory. The NATO-led North Atlantic Community fulfills these conditions because it is an institutionalized integrated community and, therefore, the theory of dramaturgical action is a good theoretical framework for understanding the process of self-presentation and framing through discourse, which leads to the transformation of the identity.

CONCLUSION

This research aimed at explaining how NATO transformed the internal component of its identity, taking on the role of an actor in the humanitarian field in the 2005 Pakistani earthquake humanitarian crisis case study. The very process through which NATO identified this humanitarian crisis as a field of interest and proved that it was not a random mission, added to NATO's identity as a well-positioned actor in the humanitarian field, as explained through the concept of framing. The framing was conducted in three steps: firstly, this crisis was discursively presented as part of NATO's tasks of cooperative security and crisis management; secondly, NATO proposed a contribution to resolving the crisis by using its capacities that other actors were unable to provide; and finally, the final framing task was to provide the *rationale* for action in the crisis for both the domestic and international audience through a narrative of solidarity. Solidarity was very important as a symbolic act, given the global impact NATO strives to achieve, and given that solidarity is the obligation for such a powerful and influential organization.

Can it be concluded that the way NATO framed the humanitarian crises has led to the transformation of NATO's identity, which is now based also on the role of actor in humanitarian crises? Social constructivists claim that identities have been produced through discourses, but Veronica Kitchen adds the crucial statement that "discourses do not form identities simply by being in the air. Actors must mobilize these resources into reflexive arguments about their community and into policy arguments about the kinds of actions they should take" (Kitchen, 2009: 101). This new role fully complements the post-Cold war "practice of doing" that replaced the Cold War "practice of talking," and ended the era of exclusively rhetorical action (Flockhart, 2012). Also, as Jennifer Mitzen's claims, identity is formed and sustained through relationships, and it is through the interaction that certain activities can be routinized so they can be easily attached to actors in order to become their roles over time

(Mitzen, 2006). Therefore, we can conclude that humanitarian activities are not occasional, but continuous activities for NATO that were developed and routinized in interaction, primarily and mostly with the UN, as a key international actor in the humanitarian field, but also with other relevant actors. As Mitzen claims, the question of whether identity associated with some role will be strengthened or undermined depends on the success in maintaining that role, and it can be said that NATO's identity as an actor in the humanitarian field is well-founded and maintained. This can be claimed at least on the basis of practical actions since the 90s of the last century. Humanitarian practices and the humanitarian narrative are a significant part of the NATO public diplomacy nowadays.

Finally, the participation in the resolution of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake humanitarian crisis has broader political significance for NATO. It has led to the increase in the scope of cooperation between NATO and Pakistan, primarily in the counterterrorism field. In addition to that, Pakistan participates in the anti-narcotics training project organized by NATO with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); participates in the civilian preparedness exercises; in disaster relief through the EADRCC and is part of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program. NATO, among other things, also provides the occasional training and education to senior Pakistani military officers (Relations with Pakistan, 2019). The development of global partnerships with countries such as Pakistan confirms that NATO is seriously working on global promotion with the aim to overcame the status of a regional organization. The main hypothesis of the research, that humanitarian crises management operations are framed as a NATO task and that these operations create the new role that the complex NATO identity is based on, has been confirmed by this research.

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ХУМАНИТАРНЕ КРИЗЕ И ЊИХОВ ЗНАЧАЈ
ЗА САВРЕМЕНИ ИДЕНТИТЕТ НАТО-А:
СЛУЧАЈ ЗЕМЉОТРЕСА У ПАКИСТАНУ 2005. ГОДИНЕ

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Резиме

Организација североатлантског споразума (НАТО) представљала је, од свог постанка па до окончања Хладног рата, стожер европске и северноамеричке безбедности и противтежу Совјетском Савезу у балансу моћи. Ипак, падом берлинског зида није само дошло до нарушавања баланса у војној моћи и наступања доба Уни поларности, већ је дошло и до великих промена у геополитичком окружењу НАТО-а и природи безбедносних претњи. У оваквим околностима, развила се дебата о опстанку и будућој улози НАТО-а у свету где оружани напад споља није више највећа претња националној и међународној безбедности, а самим тим су пољуљане и основе идентитета НАТО-а као савеза чија је једина улога одбрана и застрашивање. Почетком деведесетих, НАТО је започео стратешку трансформацију кроз коју је настојао да своје снаге, средства и свеобухватне капацитете прилагоди новим изазовима са којима су се суочиле не само НАТО чланице, већ и њихово шире окружење. Из стратешке трансформације су уследили нови задаци и ангажовања, међу којима и учешће у решавању хуманитарних криза на ободима Савеза, као и у било ком делу света где је процењено да су угрожени интереси и вредности НАТО чланица. Како је ова нова улога, тешко спојива са традиционалном улогом војног актера (и коју је, да ситуација буде још компликованија, НАТО често практиковао паралелно са војним деловањем) често била предмет критике, Савез је посебну пажњу почео да посвећује активностима у области јавне дипломатије како би радио на изградњи и очувању слике компатибилне са новим улогама које је преузео. Једна од посебно занимљивих активности јавне дипломатије је и процес уоквиривања хуманитарних криза као једне од најважнијих улога које НАТО има у постхладноратовском свету. Овај специфични облик самопредстављања НАТО-а састојао се из три корака: идентификовања хуманитарне кризе као једног од задатака дефинисаних у стратешком концепту НАТО-а; затим, други корак подразумевао је да, након што се одређена хуманитарна криза стави у оквире неког од НАТО задатака, НАТО представи свој допринос решењу идентификованог проблема, и то је најчешће чињено наглашавањем координаторске улоге и пружене логистичке помоћи коју нико од других актера није могао да пружи (или бар не на тако ефикасан начин захваљујући разрађеним процедурама поступања у случају хуманитарних криза); и најзад, трећи корак подразумева процес рационализације или образлагања јавности зашто НАТО треба да ужива подршку за ту улогу и зашто је оправдано да у конкретној кризи учествује. НАТО се, код овог корака, углавном позива на разлоге солидарности и моралне обавезе која проистиче из интерног вредносног система организације. У раду је овај процес објашњен на примеру случаја хуманитарне кризе изазване земљотресом 2005. у Пакистану. Пакистанска криза отворила је пут развоју и продубљивањеу ове улоге НАТО-а, трансформишући на тај начин његов хладноратовски идентитет заснован на улози војног и одбрамбеног актера.