

THE PROBLEMS OF DISCIPLINARY RELATIONS ON THE EXAMPLE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE

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Abstract

A high degree of disciplinary differentiation is generally evaluated as progress in improving the understanding of the dynamics of reality, but with the often-present dilemma of whether the establishment of new academic disciplines is always correct and necessary. In connection with this, the question of the justification of the strict autonomy of disciplines is being brought up to date, including attempts to assess the expediency, form and permissible degree of the intersection of ideas in the scientific space. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to attempt, through a review of relevant viewpoints, to identify key criteria for the demarcation of scientific disciplines, and to attempt to offer an answer to the question of whether their application is equally relevant in all scientific fields. Proceeding from the fact that research processes in modern science are necessarily characterised by knowledge intersection between disciplines, part of the paper is devoted to different points of view on the status of economic science within the wider corpus of social sciences. In this regard, an attempt was made to assess, based on the confrontation of different views and arguments, whether combining the content of economics and other social disciplines is an example of an acceptable degree of openness for multidisciplinary contributions, or whether it is a trend that dominantly depicts various aspects of unjustified expansionist intrusions into ‘non-native’ domains of research.

Key words: social sciences, economic science, demarcation criteria.

ПРОБЛЕМИ ДИСЦИПЛИНАРНИХ ОДНОСА НА ПРИМЕРУ ЕКОНОМСКЕ НАУКЕ

Апстракт

Висок степен дисциплинарне диференцијације углавном се оцењује као напредак у побољшању спознаје реалних кретања, али уз често присутну дилему да ли је установљавање нових академских дисциплина увек исправно и неопходно. У вези с тим актуелизује се питање оправданости строге аутономије дисциплина,

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укључујући и покушаје процене сврсисходности, облика и дозвољеног степена укрштања идеја у научном простору. Стога је циљ овог рада да се кроз преглед релевантних схватања учини покушај идентификације кључних критеријума демаркације научних дисциплина, укључујући и одговор на питање ли је њихова примена једнако релевантна у свим научним областима. Полазећи од чињенице да се истраживачки процеси у савременој науци нужно карактеришу сазнајним укрштањем међу дисциплинама, део рада је посвећен различитим гледиштима о статусу економске науке унутар ширег корпуса друштвених наука. У вези с тим учињен је покушај да се на темељу сучељавања различитих ставова и аргумента процени да ли је комбиновање садржаја економије и других друштвених дисциплина пример прихватљивог степена отворености за мултидисциплинарне доприносе, или је ипак реч о тренду који доминантно осликава различите аспекте неправданих експанзионистичких пророда на 'нематичне' домене истраживања.

Кључне речи: друштвене науке, економска наука, критеријуми демаркације.

INTRODUCTION

Increased interest in the disciplinary structure of science and the expedient demarcation of research areas occurred during the final decades of the twentieth century, in the period of intense debate about the methodology of science and the key bases for classifying academic disciplines (Abbott, 2001).

The effort to affirm the position on the need to determination the subject authenticity of academic disciplines among members of the academic community is accompanied by numerous open questions. One of the key dilemmas concerns the relevance of the problem of determining boundaries between disciplines, i.e., presenting the epistemological benefit of the complex procedure of clearly demarcating scientific disciplines. A no less important issue is the possibility of a precise definition of the concept of scientific disciplines, which presupposes the application of an appropriate approach to the demarcation of their fields of research that is adequate to current conditions.

Based on a review of relevant reflections, the aim of this paper is to provide an insight into the main problems in modelling the field of science, particularly with regard to their impact on the field of economic science. The most common criteria that guide researchers in this field in the process of determining the boundaries between individual disciplines will be pointed out. Given the increasingly pronounced trend of the exchange of ideas, concepts and methods between different areas of research, the paper will take into consideration well-argumented positions in favour of the need of maintaining the relative independence of the sciences, as well as an acceptable level of subject and methodological interpenetration between disciplines with different degrees of relatedness. It will be taken into account that research processes in modern science are necessarily characterised by multidisciplinarity and cognitive crossing between disciplines,

which certainly cannot be avoided in economic analysis either. In this context, part of the paper will be devoted to different points of view on the status of economic science within the broader corpus of social sciences.

THE RELEVANCE/IRRELEVANCE OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES

The question of the relevance of boundaries between scientific disciplines has a relatively long history. Authors from the field of philosophical and methodological sciences have different understandings of this problem, which basically resulted in the emergence of two opposing viewpoints – one, that there should be a clear and unambiguous division between the sciences (Lyotard 1984; Fuller 1991), and the other, that a scientific discipline should not unconditionally ‘defend its scientific territory,’ and that a continuous exchange of ideas and the transfer of theoretical concepts and methods between the sciences is desirable (Becker 1976; Akerlof, 1983; Coleman 1990).

Proponents of the first of the mentioned viewpoints believe that the growing division of scientific disciplines is a natural consequence of progress in the field of scientific knowledge, but also the result of the fact that the same group of problems can be viewed from different perspectives. Proponents of this point of view consider attempts to fully integrate different approaches to knowledge as unproductive, given their incompatibility and mutual incomparability. This would simultaneously collapse the coherence of theories and the specificity of methods that certain sciences have won during a long period of scientific-research ‘maturation’ (Bridges, 2006). On the other side, there is an understanding which emphasises that the process of acquiring knowledge requires intensive cooperation between academic disciplines, thus relativising their strict separation. Various conceptual constructions are used in the research community to emphasise that the position of maintaining the complete autonomy of academic disciplines is not tenable, and that their collaboration and eventual synthesis must be intensified. Thus, Salmons and Wilson (2007) use the term ‘multidisciplinarity’ for the joint use of concepts and methods characteristic of different scientific disciplines. Other similar categories are also considered relevant – ‘cross-disciplinarity’ is associated with the process of the coordinated application of various scientific concepts and methods. It is a process in which disciplines borrow resources from each other to serve the goals of their research domains, but without creating a new field of research. The ‘borrowed’ concepts are only adjusted in order to fit their meaning into the existing theoretical-methodological framework of a certain science. Multidisciplinarity refers to situations in which the study of related issues and some common problems is carried out in the spirit of comparing the research procedures and goals of different scientific disciplines. ‘Transdisci-

plinity' is identified with the mutual crossing of different scientific and academic disciplines, which as a rule results in the publication of scientific work that can be characterised as a synthetic creation of researchers from different scientific fields. In this case, representatives of different sciences identify with the newly formed research field to a significant extent, although they do not renounce their disciplinary 'origin' yet (Cat, 2017; Davis 2018). The crossing of scientific research barriers and boundaries in order to encourage the process of the intensive combination of different scientific disciplines is denoted by the term known as 'interdisciplinarity' (Petrișor, 2013). Such a form of cooperation encourages the emergence and affirmation of new domains of research, but without diminishing the achieved degree of independence of the disciplines in question (Davis, 2021).

Approaches to the Demarcation of Academic Disciplines

The phenomenon of the increasing diversification of scientific and academic disciplines, the emergence of new sciences and numerous derived disciplines increasingly open the questions of whether it is necessary to take the position on the necessity of preserving their autonomy, and on the basis of what criteria. Among the key approaches in the process of the demarcation of academic disciplines, the so-called 'problem-content' criterion occupies an important place. Its application is based on the assumption that the research of certain problems and types of phenomena represents the basic unit of differentiation of scientific fields and the subjects of their research (Serenko & Bontis, 2013, p. 138). As the number of sciences is proportional to the number of research subjects (Bermon, 2018, p. 302), the consistent application of the problem-content criterion is expected to achieve a clear specification and division of the respective scientific fields. The goal of this process is the formation of a unique identity of each scientific discipline, which implies that, under the auspices of an authentic scientific field, all the knowledge that was previously represented and scattered among different scientific fields is united and homogenised (Dascal & Dutz, 1996, p. 748).

Determining the content of the subject field of science is a very demanding process. There are opinions that the subject of research is something that is actually impossible to define reliably (Morillo et al, 2003), and that it is usually more general than a discipline. The biggest problem in that process is the necessity of achieving the so-called 'cognitive consent' of the representatives of the scientific community. That is why special attention is paid to the cognitive criterion of demarcation, the application of which postulates the point of view that there is a certain body of content, theories and methods that define the appropriate scientific and academic discipline (Sugimoto & Weingart, 2015; Dascal & Dutz, 1996).

The application of the cognitive criterion is largely inspired by the concept of the scientific paradigm of T. Kuhn, according to which the main

goal of the development of science is the establishment of a coherent tradition of scientific research and its inherent theories, instruments, models and generally accepted examples of scientific practice (Kun 1974, p. 35). Behind the realisation of that process stands the scientific community, which consists of individuals who joined together to facilitate mutual communication and establish appropriate standards of scientific research. Seen from their perspective, a scientific discipline cannot be affirmed and gain the status of general recognition through the application of universal rules and procedures, but through a process that is dominantly determined by the construction of authentic and ultimately shaped research methods and procedures (Valenza, 2009).

The application of the concept of a scientific paradigm is of particular importance when it comes to assessing the possibility of the 'maturing' and self-identification of a certain academic discipline. The condition for characterising a certain science as 'mature' and generally recognised is that, in addition to the aforementioned, it affirms the use of a special terminology based on the use of linguistic, syntactic and symbolic forms of communication. In the beginning, scientists questioned whether their scientific research discourse should become more specialised, or whether it is better to remain comprehensible to laymen, but with time, a trend of an increasing number of scientific studies with a rather specialised vocabulary was imposed. In support of specialisation as a defining feature of a scientific discipline, Valenza (2009) states that Isaac Newton, Samuel Johnson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth invented new intellectual languages. It should therefore not be surprising that a specific view is gaining currency in academic circles, according to which the first stage in the development of every scientific discipline is the establishment and affirmation of a 'new scientific language' (Shneider, 2009). With this, without underestimating the importance of applying universal forms of research and interpretation of scientific statements, the establishment of a scientific discipline is primarily understood from the point of view of using specific terminology and specific communication models (Cronin, 2005). It turns out that coming out of the shadow of universal methodology, associated with the use of generally accepted norms of language communication, and 'clearing' one's own research path are a sure way to establish a rounded scientific field and domain of interest, which guarantees a worthy position and relatively safe opportunities for the progress of each scientific discipline within the overall scientific knowledge (Huutoniemi, 2016, p. 166).

The application of the aforementioned criteria for the demarcation of scientific and academic disciplines ultimately refers to an institutional criterion that starts from the assumption that the foundation of every science is its long-acquired institutional infrastructure. In contrast to the realisation of occasional or temporary scientific research activities, the consti-

tution of scientific disciplines arises from a certain type of tradition. It is primarily reflected in support of the implementation of the training of scientific workers, the development of curricula, the publication of textbooks, the establishment of professional associations and the like (Lenoir, 1997). Instead of certain transient trends, in the dynamics of the development of a scientific discipline, its past should be identified and its present should be noted, but its future should also be traced. It is about a kind of institutionalisation of the scientific discipline, which implies continuity in the evaluation of research results and the application of a systematic approach in the study of the subject phenomena (Lattuca, 2002). As an expression of organisationally based forms of learning and systematic production of new knowledge (Krishnan, 2009, p. 9), scientific disciplines differ from each other in the way questions are formulated, in the conceptual organisation of their content, and in the basic rules for creating and testing knowledge from the respective scientific fields (Shulman, 1981, p. 6).

In all of this, we should not lose sight of the fact that the institutionalisation of a scientific discipline is not only a consequence of the evolutionary process of the maturation of science but also, in a certain sense, a potential reflection of the functioning of economic laws, the distribution of funds and the assessment of impact. Therefore, the development of scientific infrastructure - journals, projects, laboratories, departments, etc., among others, can be treated as a kind of institutional mechanism through which market relations between producers and consumers are regulated (Lenoir, 1997).

Emphasising the role of scientific infrastructure, among other things, points to the relevance of the social network approach according to which the subject discourse of academic disciplines is primarily determined by the joint work of certain groups of researchers, lecturers, practical specialists, educators, administrators and others (Волкова, p. 97). In this process, there were periods when the shaping of the subject field and the dividing lines from other sciences were done under the dominant influence of undisputed authorities in those fields of research. There were cases when the national tradition played a significant role in the identification of necessary disciplines, often supported by the active role of the state, whose authorities, by passing appropriate acts, intended to direct the course of development of a particular science. For example, in former socialist economies, the state had a decisive influence on the development of economic science and its understanding of basic economic phenomena and parameters.

Over time, the process of the constitution of scientific disciplines increasingly became the result of cooperation between scientists and researchers, whether it took place within organised social groups (Lattuca, 2002, p. 2071), or was a part of informal connections during socialising and the realisation of certain activities (Klamer & Van Dalen, 2002, p. 302). In the latter case, there are no explicitly established mechanisms for

the operationalisation of cooperation, which does not reduce the possibility of intensifying mutual communication and exchange of opinions between those who perceive themselves as members of 'invisible colleges' (Price, 1963). Under the auspices of these types of gatherings, there is a rapprochement and standardisation of attitudes, which encourages the adoption of a suitable culture of knowledge and the development of specific forms of experiencing reality. In some situations, cooperation takes on such an ambitious level that it paves the way for the emergence of new scientific disciplines.

The social-network criterion of demarcation is directly supported by the normative-value approach, which observes the division of the research area in the context of the appropriate constellation of beliefs, values and technical procedures applied by members of a certain scientific community. Instead of the naive belief that scientists work in some kind of empty space devoid of any influence, the assumption is that the process of shaping a certain disciplinary structure is characterised by a strong influence of value determinations and practical norms (Blevis & Stolterman, 2009; Douglas, 2009) – hence the vivid descriptions of science as a 'machine' for the generation of knowledge, the functioning of which is based on adherence to its own norms of production and evaluation (Huutoniemi, 2016, p. 166). The implementation of a certain system of values and related norms becomes an immanent characteristic of a scientific discipline, which is of crucial importance for establishing its relationship with other sciences.

Philosophers of science did not have identical opinions about the influence of norms and values on the modelling of the appropriate scientific field and the shaping of the disciplinary structure. Attitudes about it have changed over time, primarily under the influence of demands to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences on scientific research, and the demarcation of good and bad science (Resnik & Elliott, 2023). Unlike the twentieth century, in which most philosophers advocated the idea of value-neutral science (Douglas, 2009), the twenty-first century brought changes in thinking in the direction of accepting the influence of norms and value orientations on the conduct of scientific research, and the interpretation of their findings and results (Resnik & Elliott, 2023; Elliott 2017).

This does not exhaust the set of criteria for the demarcation of scientific and academic disciplines. In a world of limited resources dedicated to academic creativity, representatives of science are in a constant struggle to prove the relevance and usefulness of their disciplines. With that intention, they most often resort to the use of well-known and sufficiently affirmed criteria for the conceptualisation and operationalisation of certain scientific fields. In parallel with that, the process of intensive diversification of science gives rise to the creation of new, and the popularisation of some insufficiently taught criteria for building disciplinary relations. At the same time, the mere existence and independence of scientific disciplines

does not mean the explicit fulfilment of all criteria at the same time, including the possibility of their temporal variation.

There is the opinion that the partial application of certain demarcation criteria cannot give the best results, and that it is therefore better to lean towards the so-called 'combined' method based on simultaneous evaluation based on all demarcation criteria. However, such determination can be accompanied by certain problems, considering that the simultaneous respect of different demarcation criteria can cause confusion regarding the target level of disciplinary distance. For example, the application of the problem-content criterion can be in conflict with the social-network approach. In the first case, representatives of science insist on the strict demarcation of different scientific fields, while in the second case, they focus on the multidisciplinary nature of the research subject. Similarly, the application of the cognitive criterion of demarcation highlights the principle of theoretical-methodological profiling of scientific disciplines. In contrast, the application of the institutional criterion does not ignore the real problems associated with maintaining the independent status of scientific disciplines in conditions of limited resources. Fighting for survival, and in order to demonstrate their relevance and usefulness on the market, representatives of certain sciences are sometimes ready to depart from rigid theoretical positions and turn to the exchange of ideas and concepts with other scientific disciplines.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES

Despite the fact that the basic criteria for the demarcation of sciences are known and described in detail, practice shows that modelling the subject field of various sciences is quite a demanding activity. When it comes to economic science, the question of its subject profiling is still open, especially in the context of determining its status within the corpus of social sciences. In considering these relations, there are two opposing positions.

On the one hand, there is the understanding that only a clearly profiled orientation and autonomous position of economic science can contribute to the creation of preconditions for an objective, versatile and comprehensive interpretation of economic phenomena. It is based on the assumption that economics occupies a unique position among social sciences, that requires its subject of study to be approached from the perspective of the monolithicity of the dominant paradigm (King, 2013), and in light of the creation of strict deductive theories about economic reality, which do not exist in other sciences of human behaviour (Blaug, 1992, p. xvi, 4).

On the other hand, there is the experience-based point of view, which posits that economic science cannot approach its subject matter from a position of monopoly and isolation, but only through a multifaceted connection with

the disciplines across a broader spectrum of social sciences. This is supported by a considerable body of economic research from the second half of the twentieth century, whose subject matter is characterised by multidimensionality (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Ritzer, 1975), providing relatively convincing arguments that research work in this area naturally profiles itself as a meeting point of economic, sociological, philosophical and political ideas.

The consideration of the status of economics in the overall corpus of social sciences gained intensity with the emergence of marginalism and the effort of the neoclassical concept, as a currently dominant paradigm, to draw a clear line of demarcation between economics and other disciplines (Manić, 2018, p. 983). From the epistemological point of view, it is reasonable to expect economists to establish a functional paradigm capable of providing an objective explanation of economic phenomena. To achieve this, 'hard core' proponents strive to formulate exact statements about economic phenomena, applying rigorous verification procedures based on quantitative research methods and a deductive reasoning system. The methodological apparatus conceived in this way is considered a safe way of preserving the superior position of economics in the analysis of the complex decision-making mechanism on the use of available resources.

Although, thanks to this understanding of the subject of study, economics has achieved significant progress in the field of technical sophistication, and the question arises as to what repercussions this has on other social disciplines. The increasingly intensive efforts of economists to raise the principles of their science to a universal level is starting a discussion about the justification of the 'interference' of economics with the subject areas of other social sciences. The fundamental reasons for disagreement on this issue should not be sought where there is a fruitful exchange of ideas and appropriate methodological procedures between different sciences. Problems arise when there are undoubtedly unjustified expansionist intrusions into 'nematic' domains of research, which are accompanied by corresponding value judgments related to this procedure. A part of the scientific public believes that economic science deserves full attention in this respect, since the representatives of its dominant direction use a universal model of economic behaviour in explaining typical non-economic phenomena (family, marriage, politics, healthcare, education, etc.) (Becker, 1976; Hirshleifer, 1985; Buckley & Casson, 1993; Fine, & Milonakis, 2009).

The attempt to generalise economic principles and unify social sciences through the concept of rational behaviour, however, does not represent a one-way flow (Mäki, 2009), given that other scientific disciplines are equally competing for the dissemination of their ideas as universally valid, i.e., applicable to the study of every context of human activity. Thus, for example, in the objective determination of economics as the science of the behaviour of economic actors, it is possible to recognise the strong in-

fluence of psychology, which in a certain sense claims the exclusive right to study human behaviour (Hudik, 2011).

In an effort to understand the possible influence and reach of psychological conceptions in the study of economic phenomena and to take a step towards solving the relationship between economic and the psychological conceptualisation of human behaviour, different stances were formed. According to one interpretation, the fact that economics is actually a behavioural science does not make it equivalent to psychology, because it is, at least in its current dominant orientation, strictly focused on the rational aspect of human action. Advocates of a different understanding, however, believe that any effort to present economics in the light of behavioural science naturally confirms the close ties between economics and psychology. Finally, there are opinions that if economists really want to maintain a decent distance in relation to psychology, they must abandon the idea that their science is exclusively concerned with the study of the behaviour of economic actors (Hudik, 2011, p. 148).

The way out of the mentioned theoretical doubts can be largely found in the interpretation of the relationship between these two disciplines from the aspect of multidisciplinarity. Namely, the use of this term is associated with situations in which different scientific disciplines are necessarily directed to research related issues. In this specific case, it refers to the interpretation of the model of rational choice, so it is logical to expect that the research on this issue will have a strong impact on their mutual relationship, in which the development of one science affects the direction of the development of another science. In this context, economics seeks the help of psychology to penetrate forms of irrational behaviour, while psychology integrates segments of economic research to explain deviations from the rational choice model (Davis, 2021, p. 15). However, the development of these processes does not offer enough evidence that the identity of the mentioned disciplines has been threatened, and that, in the process of studying related issues, economics and psychology have clearly stepped out of their disciplinary frameworks.

Expansionist pretensions within the social sciences can also be identified in the relationship between economics and sociology (Swedberg, 1990, p. 5). Despite the impression of spreading the 'spirit' of economics to sociology, as well as the willingness to transform it on the basis of the theory of rational choice (Coleman, 1990), it is not realistic to expect that other branches of social sciences will remain silent on the imperialism of economic analysis and lay down their arms before the theory of rational choice, which has already demonstrated visible shortcomings in the consideration of economic reality itself. Moreover, we are witnessing increasingly loud requests to reverse the direction of influence between the mentioned sciences, for sociological research to become an integral part of conducting economic studies, which part of the academic community sees as

a form of the reciprocal expansionism of sociological science. A key contribution to this comes from the concept of social embeddedness, whose formulations promote the idea that it is impossible to understand the process of economic decision-making without adequate appreciation of the social, cultural and political frameworks in which it takes place (Granovetter, 1985).

The relations between ethics and economics are quite inspiring to study, especially because they significantly influence the internal structure of economic science and its openness to diverse points of view. Today, that relationship is mainly viewed from the perspective of multidisciplinarity (Cat, 2017, sect. 3.3), with the intention of emphasising their closeness in terms of the comparative interpretation and consideration of common problems. Ethics makes its breakthrough into economic science primarily through a group of heterodox economists, for whom the introduction of ethical principles is necessary in order to affirm the positions of the so-called 'normative' economies. Even economic orthodoxy is not completely immune to the influence of ethics, but only when it tries to adapt its utilitarian concepts and fit them into the dominant positivist interpretation of well-being and economic reality (White, 2018, p. 47).

The cooperation between these sciences, by all accounts, did not take on a transdisciplinary character (Davis, 2018, p. 8). This is supported by the fact that the form and scope of ethics used in economics is too scarce (White, 2018, p. 47), and that the authors of scientific papers in the domain of economics and ethics did not give up publishing in journals from their home fields (Davis, 2021, p. 16). In conditions of strong institutional specialisation, the most that could result from this cooperation is a cross-disciplinary, possibly interdisciplinary field of research (Ibid, p. 16). As in this case the mentioned disciplines are not significantly affected by their mutual interaction, the relationship between economics and ethics can primarily be described as an expression of the fruitful transfer of ideas and concepts, in which the protagonists of these sciences are generally not guided by expansionist pretensions to nematic domains of research.

CONCLUSION

Questions concerning the boundaries of fields and the interests of different sciences and their subdisciplines, the level of their autonomy, the form of mutual dependence, and the degree of openness to new insights and perspectives are still largely open and represent a legitimate subject of discussion at various levels of academic communication. In the exchange of arguments on the above topic, two opposing viewpoints are distinguished, one of which insists on a clear and unambiguous separation of sciences, while the other, referring to the current trend of intensifying the mutual transfer of ideas and concepts, considers the drawing of sharp boundaries between different scientific disciplines irrelevant.

In recent decades, there have been significant changes within numerous sciences and academic subdisciplines. These changes have mainly been in the direction of the internal restructuring of the subject specificities of the sciences, and the increasingly favourable consideration and acceptance of knowledge from other fields of research, which has most often resulted in the 'production' of new sciences and numerous derived disciplines. As the trend of growing differentiation of scientific and academic disciplines has become increasingly pronounced, the question of the possibilities and the modalities of preserving disciplinary independence has been once again raised.

Recalling that, under the conditions of a multifaceted and increasingly layered reality, it is untenable to advocate the supremacy of a universal research methodology, the advocates of a clearly defined subject definition of the sciences endeavour to enrich the current set of criteria for their demarcation. In the process of recognising and defining the basic units for the differentiation of scientific fields, representatives of the research community are mainly guided by the application of cognitive, problem-content, institutional, epistemological, and social-network demarcation criteria. This, of course, does not mean that the process of the creation, self-identification and maturation of widely recognised academic disciplines is over and that there is no reason to search for some new, more subtle forms of expressing the autonomy of the research and interest area.

An examination of the main currents in the history of economic thought shows that the pursuit of disciplinary integrity in economic science is not easily achievable, which, after all, can also be true for other disciplines within the system of social sciences. The debate about the status of economics as a scientific discipline and its relation to other social sciences is gaining intensity with the emergence of research in which economists go beyond the boundaries of their usual area of interest. Contrary to this often mentioned phenomenon, known as economic expansionism, or imperialism, representatives of the research community did not miss to note the efforts of the authors of other sciences to reciprocate with their own imperial ambitions, i.e. pretensions to the subject area of the economic science. Experience so far shows that psychology, sociology and, above all, ethics lead in this respect, which is explained by the strong influence of its theoretical positions on the internal organisation of economic science and the rivalry of different theoretical orientations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The paper is the result of research based on the obligations under the Contract on the Transfer of Funds for Financing Research and Development in 2025 (registration number 451-03-137/2025-03), concluded between the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia and the Faculty of Economics, University of Niš.

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ПРОБЛЕМИ ДИСЦИПЛИНАРНИХ ОДНОСА НА ПРИМЕРУ ЕКОНОМСКЕ НАУКЕ

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Резиме

У настојању да схвате свет који нас окружује, науке су оформиле широк репертоар сазнајних средстава – увида, метода, и идеолошки и предметно прилагођених приступа. Природно је да постоји и одговарајућа 'подела рада' – дисциплинарна диференцијација, којом се тежи ка спознаји стварности у свом богатству њених особених испољавања. Висок степен дисциплинарне диференцијације, као доминантна одредница развоја науке у данашњем времену, углавном се оцењује као напредак у побољшању разумевања реалних кретања, али уз често присутну дилему да ли је установљавање нових академских дисциплина увек исправно и неопходно. У вези с тим отвара се питање оправданости строге аутономије дисциплина, укључујући и покушаје процене сврсисходности, облика и дозвољеног степена укрштања идеја у научном простору. У раду је учињен преглед релевантних становишта о поменутим питањима, с акцентом на покушај идентификације кључних критеријума демаркације научних дисциплина, укључујући и одговор на питање да ли је њихова примена једнако релевантна у свим научним областима. У том светлу сагледана је улога проблемско-садржајног, когнитивног, институционалног, социјално-мрежног и нормативно-вредносног критеријума демаркације, са којима листа релевантних критеријума није исцрпљена. Од научне заједнице се очекује да будућа истраживања проблема изградње дисциплинарних односа усмери у правцу креирања нових и афирмацију недовољно проучаваних критеријума.

Интензивни покушаји комбиновања садржаја из различитих научних области пресликавају се и на идејни простор економске науке. Очитавају се кроз поглед на њено место у систему друштвених наука, али и на унутрашње уређење предметног подручја економије. Увереност доминантног тока економске мисли у делотворност сопственог промишљања људског делања, премда са утемељењем које може бити предмет спора, исходи у његовој прокламацији о рационалном избору као универзалној методолошкој платформи за проучавање друштвених појава – права, политику, социјалних односа, чиме је особено подручје наука које их проучавају доведено у питање.

Са друге стране, и сама економска наука је изложена трансферу идеја, метода и концепата које долазе из других наука. Присутни су аргументи на основу којих представници психологије, социологије и етике настоје да своје идеје представе као универзално важеће. У раду су, у том контексту, приказани одговарајући аспекти релација економије и поменутих наука, са намером да се ближе одреди њихов карактер.