

ТМ	Г. XXXIV	Бр. 1	Стр. 31-54	Ниш	јануар - март	2010.
----	----------	-------	------------	-----	---------------	-------

UDK 316.74:271.2

Оригинални научни рад

Примљено: 12. 11. 2009.

Andreas Buss
University of Ottawa
Ottawa (Canada)

SOCIOLOGY OF THE EASTERN ORTHODOX TRADITION

Summary

Modern sociology is to a large extent a sociology which considers society as being composed of autonomous individuals. But, as Louis Dumont has demonstrated, modern (inworldly) individualism is the result of a transformation, initiated mainly by a changing Church/State relationship since the eighth century, of the outworldly individualism of early Christianity.

This article centers on the question as to whether a similar transformation took place in the Eastern-Orthodox tradition. Early monachism and the Church/State relationship in Byzantium and in Russia, further the Russian Old Believers, the Slavophiles and the Populists are examined. The enquiry concludes that Eastern Orthodoxy has remained a tradition of holism and outworldly individualism, of 'integral personality' and of individualism as the lower path to salvation. Modern individualism has no cultural basis in this tradition. A sociology of the Orthodox tradition would therefore be able to contribute new concepts or tools to a universal sociology.

Key words: inworldly individualism, outworldly individualism, koinobion, sobornost', obshchina

INTRODUCTION

The prevalent kind of contemporary sociology deals mainly with modern Western types of society and, moreover, it stems from a development of Western thought and from a Western concept of society from which it cannot be separated. Contemporary sociology mostly does not question the very idea of society as entertained in the modern West, i.e., the idea that society lies in the interaction of autonomous individuals, and that society may be characterized by individualism.

There are those with an atomistic or empiricist scientific outlook, for whom individuals and individualism exist everywhere, in all cultures

and at all times. For them, ideas are just epiphenomena, and they do not distinguish analytically the empirical human being, the individual sample of mankind (which is indeed found in all cultures and societies) from the independent and autonomous individual to whom a paramount value is attached in modern society. The French scholar Louis Dumont (1982) has insisted on this distinction and this led him to oppose two kinds of societies: where the individual is autonomous and a paramount value, he spoke of individualism; in the opposite case, where the society as a whole is the paramount value and englobes the empirical individuals or particular human beings, he spoke of holism.

L. Dumont has also suggested that in the search for the origins of modern individualism one should follow Max Weber's example and attach prominence to religion. With this in mind, he has advanced the thesis that in early Christianity the individual as value was conceived as apart from the given social and political organization, outside and beyond it, an outworldly individual, as opposed to the inworldly individual in modern society. In traditional holistic societies – as, for instance, also in the Indian instance where the individual as value developed only outside of the hierarchical caste system among the renunciators (*samnyasin*) and in the sects –, Dumont has argued, the individual or individualism can only appear in its outworldly form in the sense that the individual has devalued or even abandoned his social rôle, and the transformation from outworldly to inworldly individual or from holistic society to individualistic society and to modernity then needs to be explained.

Dumont proposed an explanation of this transformation along the following lines: the early Christians first adopted from the Stoics the idea of a relative Law of Nature in order to partially adapt their outworldly values to the social and political world. Very soon, however, the conception by the Church of its relation to the State becomes central, for it indicates clearly the relation between the bearer of value, the outworldly individual, and the "world". The conversion of Constantine and then of the Roman Empire to Christianity forced upon the Church a closer relation to the State. The first clear result was Gelasius' formula about the relationship between the priest's *auctoritas* (authority) and the king's *potestas* (power), but the dramatic change occurred in the eighth century: the Popes broke their ties with Constantinople and claimed supreme power, not only *auctoritas* but also *potestas*, in the West. This claim was then based on the forged so-called Donation of Constantine (*Donatio Constantini*) and later justified in the theory of the two swords. The final stage is found in Calvin who suggests that the task of the individual is to work for God's glory in the world rather than taking refuge from it, and where the Church is not a holistic institution any more but a society of individuals and a mere instrument of discipline.

The inworldliness of the individual will then continue in the Protestant sects, the Enlightenment and further on, but we leave this Western line of

development, which began with the outworldly Christian individual, and shall ask ourselves what happened to this outworldly individual in the quite different context of another Christian tradition: Eastern-Orthodox Christianity or, to describe more precisely the range of this article, the Byzantino-Russian tradition. As the relationship between Church and State, which Dumont considered to be a major contributing factor in the emergence of the inworldly individual in the West, was quite different in the Eastern Roman Empire and later in Muscovite Russia, and as, moreover, there was no Reformation and no Calvin in Eastern-Orthodox Christianity, the question arises as to whether the individual in Byzantium and later in Russia has perhaps always been outworldly and whether modernity, therefore, has never taken hold there, or whether there have been other mechanisms in the Eastern Orthodox tradition which have led to inworldly individualism. This in turn leads to the question as to whether there can be a sociology of the individual in the lands of Eastern Orthodoxy.

EARLY MONKS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES

As Ernst Troeltsch stated, the early Christians were “individuals-in-relation-to-God” who, though they remained detached from and indifferent to the socio-political order, nevertheless accepted it at its level, according to Christ’s saying “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” (Matthew 22, 21). The State and its ruler, private property and slavery were not simply refused or negated; run-away slaves, for instance, were not accepted as members of monastic congregations and were sent back to their masters, but the laws and traditions of the “world” were relativized and not given the dignity that belongs to God. The Christian position was similar to and perhaps influenced by the Stoic teaching of the relative law of nature, for the Stoics taught that the wise man should practice renunciation and self-sufficiency and that the socio-political order has only a relative value. This teaching was the result of their distinction between a Golden Age when free individuals obeyed only Reason, and the present social order which, under conditions of life directed by human passions, necessitates political power, *patria potestas*, slavery and laws. Similarly the Christians taught that all social institutions which from their point of view were intolerable, were due to Original Sin and that, once lawlessness, avarice and violence have penetrated society, the law of nature has been transformed and must of necessity become evident only in the form of compulsion and of the laws of the State. This is the relative law of nature, at once the result of sin and a remedy for sin. Thus, both Stoicism and Christianity taught an outworldly ideal or, as Troeltsch also said, religious individualism.

The outworldly Christian individual could be either a simple member of the Christian Church or, since approximately the fourth century, if he did not wish to compromise with the world, an anchorite or monk. In fact,

monastic life was to a high degree synonymous with the Byzantine ideal of authentic Christian life. The world-fleeing anchorites and monks did not reject the Church, as the Montanists and Enkratits had done before them. In fact, they acknowledged its right to exist, they never lost contact with it and, since the Council of Chalcedon, their monasteries were submitted to the authority of a bishop of the Church; but they relativized its value and strove to achieve the vision of God and eternal life, beyond family and profession, in the deserts of Egypt and elsewhere. The anchorite, the renouncer of life in traditional holistic society with its laws and constraints was even more a religious individual than the simple Christian church member, but he was an outworldly individual¹, like the Indian *samnyasin* about whose renunciation of life in the caste society and of the wheel of rebirths, in order to find liberation outside the world, we read in the ancient Indian texts. And, like the Indian renouncers, the Christian anchorites might live as hermits or join a group of fellow anchorites. This development started with Pachomius, the initiator of a tendency towards cenobitic (communal) monasticism, and came into full flower with Basil the Great who preconised communal living in a single monastery and provided the inner biblical and theological foundations for the cenobitic living of the outworldly Christian individuals, the monks. His monastic rule merits closer examination, not only because his way of seeing the relationship between the individual and the community was original, but also because it portended developments within the Russian-Orthodox religion and, in fact, in Russian society, more than a millennium later.

According to Basil², the anchoritic ideal falls short of the demands of Christ for, apart from the love of God, Christ demanded the love of our

¹ The outworldly individual may be described as someone who relativizes his social role or, if he is a monk or anchorite, who leaves his social role in order to adopt a role which has no equivalent in society and which is both personal and universal.

It might be argued that the concept of the outworldly individual cannot capture the deeper meaning or the essence of man's real nature in Byzantine theology, since the Cappadocian Fathers developed the theory of the person and of *theosis* according to which man is not "autonomous" but destined to share divine life, and where his role in the created world can be fulfilled only if he keeps intact the image of God (Meyendorff, 1975, p. 4), – and it is certainly true that most modern social science does not distinguish clearly enough between the two concepts of the person and of the individual (the concept of the person has, since Antiquity, generally implied a relationship, e.g. the actor's role on the stage, the social role in Rome, the relationship of the three divine *personae* in Augustine's Trinitarian theology).

Nevertheless, it is in relation to modern society that today's individual and the early Christians have something in common; and it is solely for our understanding that it is useful to speak of the early Christians as outworldly individuals who, although very different from us in other respects (their concept of the person and of *theosis*), felt, like the modern inworldly individual, relatively autonomous in relation to society.

² A commented résumé of Basil's Rule can be found in K. Holl (1898). pp. 160 sqq.

neighbour. The specific charismatic gifts of the anchorite remain fruitless for all others, and he himself, as he does not possess all charismatic gifts, cannot raise himself to the complete fulness of spiritual life. He lacks, moreover, the necessary critical stance with regard to his own mistakes and shortcomings as well as all support in spiritual matters. On the other hand, many individuals living in common can more easily fulfill a large number of commandments than a single individual, for often the fulfillment of one commandment prevents the fulfillment of another. Basil maintains, in fact, that the charismatic gifts of every individual have been received for the benefit of others and that in the cenobitic life the energy of the Holy Spirit, which is given to a single individual, is the common good of the whole community. Therefore, not only our own shortcomings necessitate the communal life: it is the essence of the Christian ideal that it can only be attained by a community, for only a community can fulfill all demands of Christ. While Pachomius had left open the question as to whether the monks could leave the community and return to the "world", Basil considered such an act as a desecration of the *koinobion*.

In Basil's Rule we have the first instance of the idea that individualism, be it inworldly or outworldly, is the little path, that the *koinobion* is not only a useful means of physical protection and material comforts which the renouncer or anchorite can join and leave at his will, but the necessary precondition to a full spiritual life and the high road to salvation. It is also worth mentioning that Basil's *koinobion* has little in common with Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft*, which is described as organically grown, based on the naturally given conditions, the ties of blood and location, the traditional unity and wholeness of family, tribe and *Volk*, for the *Gemeinschaft* does not know of the individual, it has not yet conceived and experienced it, whereas the *koinobion* is the result of the joining of independent individuals at a higher level of community.

Basil also required the monks to work, partially as an ascetic means of combatting idleness and passions, but mainly for social reasons, i.e. in order to support the indigent. This, however, introduced an inner contradiction into Basil's ideal, for the obligation to work in the service of others and the rule of complete obedience cannot completely be harmonized with the highest goal of the monks and of Basil himself: the concentration of all thoughts in God and the contemplation of divine beauty. Only the anchorite could hope to attain completely the uninterrupted devotion to God which even Basil recognized to be the highest goal, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the anchoretic life, in spite of Basil's efforts and in spite of the renewal of his Rule by Theodore Studites in the eighth century, continued to be regarded as superior to the cenobitic life (Holl 1898:198). The outworldly individual kept his preeminence, and particularly the ideal of *laborare* (in the formula '*ora et labora*', later attributed to the Benedictines) did not prevail in Eastern-Orthodox monachism (Savramis 1966).

The idiorhythmic movement and hesychasm later on reinforced this tendency. It is not surprising that even later in Russia the outworldly monks were considered superior to the priests .

Revealing for the struggle between the outworldly individualistic ideal of the anchorite and Basil's cenobitic ideal was the distinction which started to be made even within the monasteries between the regular monks and those monks who, after thirty years (in Russia) of unblemished ascetic life, were allowed to take a higher vow (μεγαλοσχημοι)³. While the regular monks looked after the economic aspects of life in the monastery, the *megaloskhimi* were freed from all work and from some of the common prayers and liturgical chants in order to devote themselves completely to a secluded *vita contemplativa*. Bishops who took this vow had to resign from their position.

Karl Holl regrets that Theodor Studites who is our first source regarding the distinction between the monks of the *mikroskhima* and of the *makroskhima*, did not tell us anything about the motives which led to it (Holl 1898:200). From a sociological perspective, however, the motives are quite clear: the defenders of the cenobitic ideal tried to integrate the option of an anchoritic life into the monastery, to accept the anchoritic life-style as merely a moment at the end of a long cenobitic life of service to the monastic community. The adoption of the anchoritic ideal as the last stage of life within a cenobitic monastery seems to have been an attempt to limit the outworldly and individualistic anchoritic ideal, as it could not be negated, for the *koinobion* continued to be considered as the elementary school of world renunciation while the anchoritic life remained the high road to perfection.

Later, in Russia, the anchoritic and cenobitic ideals as well as the attempted reconciliation of them in the theory and practice of the *megaloskhima* lived side by side since the beginnings of monasticism in the caves near Kiev. The cenobitic Rule of Studion, itself based on Basil's Rule, was again adopted as model by Sergius of Radonezh in the fourteenth century and, in the fifteenth, by Joseph of Volokolamsk, the founder of the Josephite movement which achieved considerable influence at court and in the Church. The Josephite movement, however, which stressed the importance for the cenobitic monasteries to own land, succeeded by political means, as will be seen later, in repressing the anchoritic monachism of Nil Sorski and the "Trans-Volga Elders" who lived in groups of two or three in small skits and who strongly stressed non-possession and the hesychastic prayer. In thus raising the value of the *koinobion* and largely reducing the importance of outworldly individualism, the Josephites have given the cultural development of Russia its characteristic aspect.

³ Heiler 1971 p. 258 & 272; I. Smolitsch 1953, p. 264.

THE EMPEROR AND THE CHURCH IN CONSTANTINOPLE

When, under Constantine in the fourth century, Christianity had achieved a respected and leading role in the Empire, the Church had to react and to reconsider its relationship with the State and the Emperor. The conception which the Church developed of its relationship to the State would be central in the evolution of the relationship between the outworldly individual and the 'world'.

In this context, it will be unavoidable to refer to the concept of caesaro-papism which has in the past often (although in recent times with more hesitation and more sparingly) been used to denote the State/Church relationship in the Byzantino-Russian tradition. Sometimes, the concept simply denotes the ancient sacral kingship of archaic societies where the idea of the unity of religious authority and political power was never lost; at other times, however, and particularly in the case of historical religions (which tend to be associated with the emergence of differentiated religious activities and at least partially independent religious and political hierarchies – e.g. by R. Bellah in his ideal-typical scheme of religious evolution), the term tends to be used whenever a political leader, an Emperor or Tsar, has 'arrogated' to himself spiritual functions or, more often, an influence on the religious organization. This may happen either on the factual level or because of the personal dispositions of an Emperor, and contrary to the prevailing ideology, or it may be that the prevailing ideology does not exclude or prevent this possibility or that it even justifies it.

The discussion about caesaro-papism in Byzantium has sometimes been confusing because it has not always been recognized that there were two theories on the relationship between Church and Empire which cannot easily be reconciled, – a fact, it may be noted in passing, which probably led Troeltsch to think that the Roman-Hellenistic State, with its ancient laws and ancient culture, only compromised with Christian thought but never inwardly became united with it; that there developed no inwardly uniform Christian society, as in the West, but that the whole system became a parallelism whose component parts could only be kept in right relation with each other by the Emperor.

On the one hand, ideas of Hellenistic sacral kingship as well as the memory of the Emperor's role as *pontifex maximus* always survived in Byzantium, and the old Roman legal statement that *publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit* (public law is centered on sacred ceremonies, priests and officials – Ulpian, Dig. I, 1, 1, 2), indicating that religious matters are part of public law, was not forgotten. Eusebius called Constantine the overseer of external Church matters, and the Emperors did indeed appoint the patriarchs, they defined the borders of the ecclesiastical provinces, they might decree certain ecclesiastical legislation, and synodal decisions needed their approval. Moreover, the Christian Emperors were thought to be 'spirit bearers' (Beck 1959:36), although not in the same sense

as bishops or priests, and their right to govern was based on their *pneuma*. Therefore, when Justinian, in his Sixth Novella, talked of the *symphonia* between the priesthood and the imperial dignity, he did not mean a harmony between two powers or two distinct societies, but the internal cohesion and unity of purpose of a single human society.

But frictions with the Church arose around points of doctrine and of liturgy. For the sake of political unity there were imperial interventions in connection with Arianism and in the monophysitic and monotheletic debates but, as in the case of the ensuing iconoclastic controversy, where the political interests of the Empire seemed to be on the side of iconoclasm and also later when, again for political reasons (for help against the Turks), a union with Rome was attempted at the Councils of Lyons (1274) and Florence (1439), the Emperors were not able to impose their will on the Christian population. There were explicit denials of doctrinal authority to the Emperors by anti-iconoclastic writers like John of Damaskus and Theodore Studites.

The doctrinal debates centered mainly on the question of how to understand and formulate the union of the other-worldly and the this-worldly, or of God and man in Christ⁴. During the iconoclastic struggle the question was rather if and how the unity of the sacred and the material, or of the other-worldly and the this-worldly, can occur in the icon. In the thinking of early Christianity, there was, in fact, a whole series of similar oppositions which were fundamental to Christian thought. As in letter/spirit and old dispensation/new dispensation or also other-worldly/this-worldly, two poles were opposed to each other and yet united by their complementarity. There was, moreover, a hierarchical relationship between the poles in the sense that one of them was thought of as better than or as superior to the other. In an analogous way, the outworldly individual and the world were two such poles, and the attempts by the Church, the concomitant of outworldly individualism, to clarify the proper relationship between itself and the State, must be seen in the same context.

Gelasius, pope in Rome at the end of the fifth century, taught that the Church is superior to the Empire regarding things divine whereas the religious individual as a member of the Church is subject to the Emperor in

⁴ According to the dogma of incarnation, developed since the fifth century, Christ was thought to be an icon of God and still a living being. He had rendered the divine visible in a human body. During the iconoclastic struggle this led to the further idea that a unity of the sacred and the material, of the other-worldly and the this-worldly, may also occur elsewhere, and particularly in the icon itself. On the basis of Aristotle's distinction between matter and form Theodore Studites taught that in the authentic image (icon) we have the real Christ or a real Saint – only the matter is different (Harnack 1991, p. 275). Louis Dumont has ventured the idea that the core of Christianity itself lies in the assertion of an effective transition between the outworldly and the inworldly, in the incarnation of value.

worldly matters. According to him, the religious individual has not entered the “world” but is seen in a hierarchical relationship with it.

Photios, patriarch in Constantinople after the end of the iconoclastic struggle in the latter part of the ninth century, was the probable author of the Epanagoge (Eisagoge), an introduction to a planned publication of a revised Byzantine law collection. The Epanagoge is remarkable not only because it attributes jurisdictional primacy in the Church to the patriarchal seat of Constantinople, but also because of its statements on the relationship between the Emperor and the Patriarch, the Empire and the Church. On the basis of Aristotle’s teaching, Photios maintained that the substances are composed of form and matter, living substances of soul and body, and that the Church directs the *politeia* as the soul directs the body, as its formal and final cause, giving it unity and purpose. Similar to an icon, the *politeia* and the Church are combined in a higher unity in which, however, they remain perfectly distinct (perhaps a reference to the distinctiveness of the divine and the human in the person of Christ, as established by the Council of Chalcedon), and this higher unity is again called a *politeia* by Photios.

According to the Epanagoge, the Emperor is not only the head of this new *politeia*, but also the first representative of the Church which is conceived as a mere department of the Christian *politeia*. One of the Emperor’s functions is the creation and the preservation of morality among men by the proclamation of laws. The Patriarch, on the other hand, has no claim to superiority, although morally he stands besides the Emperor. He interprets the dogma and the Tradition, but should be “crucified to the world” (Epanagoge III,3). Any interest in socio-political matters is denied to him; he is an outworldly individual.

On the basis of these theories it was possible for the Church to resist most attempts by the Emperors to impose their views or their political agenda in matters of doctrine and liturgy, at least since the iconoclastic crisis.⁵ At the same time, monasticism, reflecting ideal-typically the attitude of the outworldly individual or of those who are, in the terminology of the Epanogoge (and also of Galatians 6, 14), “crucified to the world”, acquired more influence, because mainly monks had led the resistance against the iconoclastic policies. This trend received new support when the Athos monk Gregory Palamas, in his dispute with the philosopher Barlaam, had rejected secular humanism and the implicit nominalism which underlay Barlaam’s affirmations about God, and had led the hesychastic movement to victory at a Church Council in 1351.

⁵ Most scholars seem to suggest that there was more independence of the Church after the iconoclastic struggle (Ostrogorsky, Barker) while others (e.g. Svoronos) point out that the Emperor acquired more influence over the Church as an institution after the iconoclastic struggle as the patriarchs now had to take an oath of allegiance to the Emperor.

Outworldly individuals, having left their rôle in society, tend to accept a personal and, at the same time, a more universal rôle. It is therefore not surprising that the monks who directed the Church during the last phase of the Empire, had, according to Meyendorff, a more supernatural outlook and attitude than the State which, in difficult political circumstances, tended more and more to withdraw to an interpretation of the *politeia* in terms of its Hellenic heritage and culture. In conformity with the Epanagoge, though, the Church did not presume to be able to stand alone. This was clearly stated in the often quoted letter of the Patriarch Antonios to the Grand Prince Basil of Moscow in 1397: It is not possible for Christians to have the Church and not to have the Empire; the Empire and the Church have a great unity and community, and it is impossible to separate them from one another (Meyendorff 1981:103).

Whether one takes Gelasius' hierarchical order or Photios' Aristotelian distinction between form and matter, or whether one simply considers the succession of historical events, it is clear that in early Christianity and in Byzantium the line between the *sacerdotium* and the *regnum* was not drawn in the same way as in the Occident. It is possible to talk of caesaro-papism in Byzantium in the sense of imperial domination of external Church matters or of the legal aspects of the Church's structure; it is, moreover, possible to talk of caesaro-papistic inclinations of some Emperors with regard to doctrine and liturgy, supported by the old Hellenistic theory of sacral kingship, but questioned and resisted by the theories which the Church itself had developed of its relationship with the State. But never did the Church usurp the functions of the *imperium*, at least not on the ideological level, and no effort was made by the outworldly individual to enter and to rule the 'world'.

It has been possible to talk of the spiritualization of the Church in Byzantium, while in the West, with the papal assumption of a political function and with the claim to an inherent right to political power, the Church became inworldly and the formerly outworldly Christian individual became more intensely involved in the world since the so-called Papal Revolution which had its main sources in Cluny and in the Gregorian Reform, long before the Reformation⁶. A short insertion about these Western events will be useful here for comparative purposes; they will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

The Cluniacs were the first monastic order in which all the monasteries, scattered throughout Europe, were subordinate to a single head, the

⁶ It is becoming more widely recognized that the Gregorian Reform or what Berman calls the Papal Revolution in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, was the first great turning point in the history of the West, the source of major aspects of Western social thought, because of the violent separation of the ecclesiastical polity from the secular power and then the subordination of the secular power.

Abbot of Cluny – and in this respect they served as a model of a single translocal organization and of a corporate unity for the Roman Catholic Church as such and particularly for its clergy. A clear distinction between the clergy and the laity was now drawn, the formerly holy Emperor becoming a simple layman, lower than the lowest priest. The Cluniacs also got involved in the political movement of *pax terrae* and they attacked simony and nicolaism (clerical marriage) and thus furthered the independence of the Church from the feudal structure.

Building on these ideas, Pope Gregory VII, in his *Dictatus Papae* (1075) declared the political and legal supremacy of the papacy over the Church and the independence of the clergy from secular control – while earlier emperors and kings had invested the bishops not only with their civil and feudal authority, but also with their ecclesiastical authority, similar to the situation in Byzantium. Gregory VII went even further and declared the ultimate supremacy of the Pope in secular matters, including the authority to depose and to excommunicate emperors and kings. The papacy thus assumed a political and inworldly function, and we can speak from now on, with regard to it, of spiritual power (*potestas*), rather than of spiritual authority (*auctoritas*)⁷. The outworldly individual had stepped into the world and now acted in it.

THE TSAR AND THE CHURCH

In Russia, on the other hand, after more than two hundred years of Mongol rule by the Golden Horde had come to an end, the Byzantine ideal of the *symphonia* between Church and State which cannot exist without each other, was remembered again. The Muscovite princes had already begun to consider themselves as the protectors of Orthodoxy, and when the Metropolitan Isidoros had signed the decree of the Union of Florence (1439) between the Eastern and the Western Church, he was immediately arrested after his return to Moscow. Later, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Orthodox Church, and particularly the Josephite monks, saw in the Mus-

⁷ If we take our concepts from the Western tradition and from Political Science which analyses it, we tend to think and to speak of the temporal and of the spiritual ‘power’ and of the ‘struggle’ between the two almost in the same way in which we talk of a war between two secular powers. This way of thinking has been common since the time when the Popes claimed not only religious authority but also political power and thus introduced a fundamental ideological change in Western society. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that the Byzantines also thought in terms of two powers. When Ostrogorsky (1968, p. 294) translates a passage by Leo Diaconus (101), a Byzantine historian, in the following words: “I acknowledge two powers in this life, the priesthood and the Empire”, he commits what might be called a westernism. A better translation, in view of the term *αρχη* would be: “I acknowledge two principles (or: realms) in this life, the priesthood and the Empire”.

covite ruler, who began to call himself Tsar, their sole support, and they revived the political theory of Agapetos (6th century), according to whom “the emperor in body is like all others, yet in power of office he is like God.” But the study of Byzantine writings, including the *Eisagoge*, did not preclude a development of the relationship between Church and State, and of the status of the individual, in which the accents must be put differently.

Two different conceptions of monachism and of the Church developed at that time. Joseph of Volokolamsk, founder of the Josephite movement, stressed the necessity of landownership for the Church with the argument that it was needed for charitable causes, furthermore he argued that, if the monks had to work for their living, they would not have the time to acquire the knowledge and experience required to become bishops (the Orthodox Church draws its bishops from the ranks of the monastic clergy), and finally that the socially higher elements of society would not wish to enter monastic life at all. Nil Sorski, on the other hand, a monk of the hesychastic tradition and with strong ties to Mount Athos, had settled as a hermit in the wilderness of the Upper Volga, envisaging an ideal church, unencumbered by worldly responsibilities, as the moral conscience of the country. He denounced the monasteries for owning land and insisted that only a poor Church can be the moral conscience of the country and will be able to face up to the Tsar. At the same time, the followers of Joseph and Nil were opposed on the question of how to treat heretics in general, and in particular the so-called Judaizing sect which had gained some influence in Novgorod.

Nil's movement of the “Trans-Volga-Elders”, who wanted to live hidden from the “world”, represented more than others the tradition of outworldly individualism in Russia. When it was repressed with the help of the Muscovite princes (Nil's disciples were persecuted, imprisoned, sometimes killed, and it is suspected that certain of Nil's writings of which only the title is known today, were intentionally destroyed), and when the Josephites gained the upper hand, at least at the official level, this represented a break with an important aspect of the Russian-Orthodox church ideology. After this, outworldly individualism survived only in the northern forest regions of Russia (Kapiton and his followers may serve as examples) and later in certain sects, but its importance was reduced, and the official church ideology gradually integrated the individual into the *koinobion*.

Moreover, on the basis of the prophecy of Daniel, the Josephites developed the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome. The Rome of Peter and the Rome of Constantine (Constantinople) have fallen, the monk Philotheos wrote, but the Third Rome (Moscow), the only pure Christian empire in the world, stands, and a fourth there will not be. These words could be interpreted as an appeal to the Tsar to accept the role of sovereign and universal emperor in the Roman tradition (this view was adopted by the so-called Stoglav, a synod held in 1551), but also as the appeal to accept the re-

sponsibility for the continued existence of the world (Nitsche 1991:94), for Rome, according to this theory, was the last of the four empires in Nebuchadnazzar's dream. In any case, the Tsar was seen as the head of the Church to whom the clergy owed obedience and who sometimes even superseded canonical and ritual considerations.

There was no separation and hierarchical ordering of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as it had developed during the Papal Revolution in Western Europe. Nothing had changed since Justinian had declared in Novel 131 that the canons of the Oecumenical Councils are to be observed as laws of the Empire. The Tsars did not feel bound by Natural Law and Ecclesiastical Law; they, in fact, sanctioned ecclesiastical legislation, convoked synods, designated hierarchical candidates and sometimes judged clerical personnel and thus completely dominated the external aspects of the Church. While it is true that judicial immunities were often granted to 'church people' and that the inhabitants of ecclesiastical estates were mostly under the jurisdiction of their clerical superiors, these privileges could also be revoked by tsarist fiat, as happened in the State Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649. But the Tsar's authority went beyond the purely external aspects of the Church.

Ivan IV, for instance, insisted that the autocratic Tsar's will is God's will, and he did not hesitate to order the killing of a metropolitan who, in defense of ecclesiastical law, resisted his wishes. Any attempt to show that the *sacerdotium* is greater than the *imperium* (as the case of Maximus the Greek, who denied the religious nature of the Tsar's autocracy and was incarcerated, shows), was considered heretical. The fact that in 1589 Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate did not change the situation. Even the so-called Donation of Constantine was evoked by the Russian Church only in support of the claims to its landed estates and other economic privileges, but never to point to the superiority of the *sacerdotium*, contrary to the situation in the West where it had been used to justify the Church's claims of political superiority.

It is true that during the "Time of Troubles" (*Smuta*), the Church was the sole element of socio-political cohesion and even fulfilled political tasks (the Patriarch Job convoked and chaired a *Zemskii Sobor* in order to determine who could qualify as a ruler), but this was undertaken with the intent of stabilizing the State and not in order to acquire lasting political influence. Not much later, Tsar Alexis did not hesitate to intervene in matters of ecclesiastical discipline and Church ritual (e.g. the *edinoglacie* discussion, relating to "single voice" in chants and liturgy).

While Medlin (1952:146/8) argues that Tsar Alexis may have come closer than any of his predecessors to imaging the ideal prince of East Rome and that Moscow was a direct reflection of the Byzantium of Justinian I, others⁸ have suggested that the Byzantine ideal of harmony between

⁸ Benz 1971, p. 147; Pipes, 1974.

Church and State had largely disappeared since Ivan IV and even that Moscovite political ideology was always more influenced by Asiatic despotism than by Roman or Byzantine law. It is clear, in any case, that, contrary to the situation in Byzantium where the Church with the help of outworldly monks became more independent in regard to dogmatic and liturgical questions after the iconoclastic struggle and later after the victory of the hesychastic movement, Russia remained more caesaropapistic. According to Kapterev, the decisive word in both ecclesiastical and secular affairs belonged to the sovereign, particularly after the metropolitan began to be appointed independently from the patriarch in Constantinople. This was mainly the result of the repression of the outworldly individualism of the hesychastic Trans-Volga-Elders by the Josephite movement.

Only the Patriarch Nikon in the seventeenth century, motivated perhaps by the fact that he had been asked to look after the administration of the state in the absence of the Tsar in times of war, tried to establish the superiority of canon law and ecclesiastical law over all civil law; only he tried to attribute to the spiritual authority an ultimate supervision over secular matters when he stated that the bishop has a certain interest in secular jurisdiction for its better direction, while the Tsar has none whatever in ecclesiastical and spiritual administration, and when he added that in certain cases it is in the power of the bishop to issue a censure or excommunication against the Tsar.⁹ Nikon's ideas were perhaps influenced by Western thought. But not only were his personal ambitions in the end not supported by the Tsar, but the ecclesiastical council of 1666/67 flatly refuted the political philosophy of this Patriarch who, like the Tsar, liked to assume the title of *velikii gosudar'* (great lord of the land). The Byzantino-Russian political tradition resumed immediately after Nikon, although the Tsar at first renewed the clergy's rights and privileges.

But in the West it was the time of Absolutism and of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) by Louis XIV, and absolutistic ideas now started to penetrate Russia. Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate and the ecclesiastical courts; the newly established Department of Monasteries appropriated to itself the administration of all church properties and an obligatory oath of allegiance of the clergy to the Tsar was introduced. The supreme jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters (with no clear distinction between the *ius circa sacra* and the *ius in sacra*, in the terminology of Pufendorf whose writings then entered Russia) resided, more than ever before, in the State.

It was a State which did not see its purpose any more in the creation of the conditions for morality and religious salvation, but which saw in the interests of the State itself the ultimate standard for judging all actions; a State in which the Emperor or Tsar was considered to be above the laws

⁹ Palmer 1871, Vol I, p. 251 sqq.

(*princeps legibus solutus*) and which was not kept in check by anything resembling the modern tradition of thought which considers the State to be made up of autonomous individuals.

THE RUSSIAN OLD BELIEVERS

Outside of Russia schismatic movements and sects have often been found to have a close affinity to individualism. In Calvinism, for instance, the Church had been dissolved as a holistic institution, as an institute of grace and salvation, and had become a mere instrument of discipline for the individuals of which it considered itself to be composed. Max Weber underlined that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism which, according to him, can be identified in the national characters of the peoples with a Puritan past, and Louis Dumont has analysed the outworldly individualism of the Indian renouncers and their close connection with Indian sectarian movements. Was there a place for individualism and of what kind was that individualism in the schismatic and sectarian movements of Russia?

Superficially seen, the Russian Raskol (schism) resulted from the reaction of the uneducated sectors of the population who clung to unimportant or even trivial aspects of the Church ritual, attaching magical forces to them, when the Patriarch Nikon tried to assimilate Russian rituals to those of the Greek tradition. Particularly Protestant interpreters, viewing the essence of religion in dogma rather than ritual, have shown little understanding for the 'superstitious accentuation of trifling points of ritual' by the Old Believers. Kartashov has shown, however, that the Russian-Orthodox people consider the icons as not created by human hands (*nerukotvornyi*) and the Church ritual as sacred, and that through them it is thought possible to attain already in the present, although temporarily, the true life and a glance at salvation. These ideas, moreover, were related to the ideology of the Third Rome which underlined the mission of Moscow to conserve the pure truth of the Orthodox religion, especially at a time which feared the impending arrival of the Antichrist. Nikon's reforms and, soon afterwards, Peter's Absolutism appeared to many to be the result of the arrival of the Antichrist.

Those who decided on a break with the official Church, the Old Believers, faced the difficulty that no bishop had joined the Schism and that therefore no new priests could be ordained. Soon they were deprived of priests and of most sacraments (communion and marriage in particular), except those sacraments which, according to ancient ecclesiastical usage, laymen can perform (baptism and confession), yet they had nothing in common with Protestants who believe that sacraments are '*magis opinione quam re*' (are effective through the opinion of the believers rather than in themselves). Not out of the conviction that the sacraments are useless, did

they reject them. On the contrary, they believed them to be necessary, but they thought it impossible to have them because of the lack of priests.¹⁰

There were those who tried to attract the priests of the 'Nikonian Church' to their cause, the so-called priestists (popovtsy), but the group which grew most, the priestless (bezpopovtsy), rejected this compromise and all other contacts with the world of Antichrist. The life of laypersons in a Church directed by priests was not available to them any more, and out of the whole Christian tradition only the lifestyle of monks, but of "monks without vows", in S.A. Zenkovsky's words (1970:442), remained to them.

Some of them broke all ties with society and lived homelessly as so-called Wanderers (*stranniki* or *beguni*) an outworldly individualism, although they might be supported by members of their group who continued to live in the world but had taken a vow to become Wanderers one day¹¹.

Most Old Believers, though, cut loose from the holistic ties with the Church and unable to marry, because the sacrament of marriage was unavailable to them, lived the life of "monks without vows" in the world, the life of a certain inworldly individualism perhaps, but of an individualism which was considered to be only the low path to salvation. For it was an individualism accepted by necessity and not by choice or as an ideal, accepted only because of the loss of the holistic Church. Moreover, the Old Believers continued to live within the Russian-Orthodox tradition which, since the Josephite movement, had preferred the Basilian concept of the higher importance of the koinobion, of the community, of what was soon to be called the sobornost'.

Everywhere the Bezpopovtsy who, by fate and circumstances, found themselves divorced from the traditional Church, adopted the Basilian and Josephite idea that the communal life is the higher road to perfection. The leader of the Pomorcy group of the Bezpopovtsy, A. Denisov, ignored the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome and of the Tsar as the spiritual and autocratic leader of the Church; he introduced the idea of the primacy of the Russian people as the bearer of spiritual authority and, for the first time in Russian literature, used the terms *sobor* and *sobornyj* with the particular connotation of communal organization blessed by God. Like most Russian monasteries, Denisov's Vyg community also applied the principle of common ownership and, according to S. Zenkovsky, became a miniature socialist

¹⁰ The distance of the early Raskol from protestant and especially calvinist individualism is striking in the autobiography of Avvakum, one of its most revered leaders in the seventeenth century, for it always stresses the congruence of the author and his social position in a world which remained, in Weberian terminology, an 'enchanted garden'.

¹¹ According to Conybeare (1921), the organization of the Wanderers closely resembled that of the Cathars, for the Elect Cathar cut himself off from the world, while the other adherents continued to live in the world, fed and sheltered the Elect and cherished the hope of being themselves elected one day.

state, based on a collective economy. Also the communal rules of the Theodosians, another priestless group, were similar to those of the monastic rule of Josif of Volokolamsk. They also lived like monks without vows, had common property, worked for the community, had common prayer halls and common institutions for the invalid and the old.

Because of the loss of the sacrament of marriage various solutions were discussed for those who felt unable to live without a wife. For some, marriage consisted in a simple agreement of the parties, a dissoluble union, others considered marriage part of natural law and independent of any sacrament or rite – certainly an individualistic position – but marriage was nevertheless always considered as an evil to be tolerated, and married couples were not generally accepted as full members of the community and during religious services were given a place behind the congregation (Conybeare 1921:200-205). Clearly, in this case also the individualistic position was the low path to salvation. Individualistic considerations based on the idea of natural law were accepted at an inferior level and were englobed by the ideal of *sobornost'* of the “monks without vows”.

On the whole, it may therefore be said that the Russian schismatics were either outworldly individuals or placed inworldly individualism at a hierarchically lower level than the englobing *sobornost'*. Modern individualism has not been produced by them.

SLAVOPHILES AND POPULISTS

When the Crimean war broke out in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was seen by many, in Russia as well as in the West, as the result of a struggle of two essentially different worlds which opposed each other not only as political enemies, but as the embodiments of two disparate spiritual principles or ideologies. There was no unanimity as to whether the hostile and aggressive mood which then resulted in war, originated in Russia or in the West. The Western powers saw themselves in an inescapable struggle against a totally different barbarian world, as the representatives of rights and freedoms against tyranny and slavery, while Russia saw itself as the true and only defender of Orthodoxy against Enlightenment and revolution.

Not only those in nineteenth century Russia who felt that their own culture was threatened by the modern individualist culture of the West, but Westernizers and Slavophiles alike had in common the conviction of a basic ideological and spiritual difference between Russia and Europe, and that the key to understanding Russia must be sought in the Orthodox religion. The Russian minister of culture, Uvarov, had in 1832 formulated the foundations of Russian cultural policy as autocracy, Orthodoxy and *narodnost'*. *Narodnost'*, a term which perhaps was derived from German romantic thought (for it denotes what in German is called *Volkstum*), suggested, in

combination with Orthodoxy, the importance of the social whole. But the Russian cultural policy did not request a complete turning away from Europe, it only condemned any infatuation with the West; only the “so-called European ideas”, those which questioned the autocracy of the Tsar and the Orthodox religion, were to be rejected (Schelting 1948:25).

A few years later P. Chaadaev, in his First Philosophical Letter (1836), had found in Byzantino-Russian Orthodoxy an “*idée défigurée*” of Christianity, he had criticized its caesaro-papism and its passive-contemplative ethics and had proposed the total reeducation of the Russian people in order to imprint on them the same inner predispositions and the same attitude towards life which in the West, according to him, were the result of a long education in the Catholic tradition. But even Chaadaev abhorred the “so-called” Europe, the revolutionary and individualistic Europe of the French Revolution and ideas of a social contract (Schelting 1948:170). He accepted and preconised individualism, but only to the extent that it did not endanger the englobing social whole.

Slavophilism was at least partially a reaction to Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letter as well as it was an answer to the encroachments of the culture of the Enlightenment. It rejected all foreign influences and proposed to return to Russia’s own sources, to the true Orthodox religion, for only in Russia true Christianity was thought to have been possible because its traditional social organization, the village commune (*obshchina* and *mir*), supposedly had an affinity with the Christian community.

Particularly Khomyakov underlined the importance of the Orthodox religion for understanding Russia. The Orthodox Church, according to him, emphasizes the primacy of the social whole, and only in the Church, in brotherly love for others, he suggested, does the individual human being find his talents. The concept of the ‘Church as a whole’ did not mean for Khomyakov the total sum of individual adherents of Orthodoxy. What he called *sobornost’*, denoted a perfect organic fellowship and togetherness of people united by faith and love. Incidentally, *sobornost’* was the Church Slavonic translation of the Greek *ekklesia* (church). It was the home of the person in the Orthodox sense and the condition of its development – whereas the individual in the modern sense had no place in it.

Khomyakov’s epistemology is particularly interesting. According to Walicki’s interpretation of his writings, possession of truth is not a function of individual consciousness, but is entrusted to the Church. Truth is inaccessible to isolated individual thinkers who are condemned to partial knowledge, or to ‘rationality’, while the organic fellowship of *sobornost’* makes true understanding possible. It should be mentioned in passing that V. Soloviev later elaborated the idea that truth and integral religious justice cannot be attained in isolation, but are given only to the universal Church (Soloviev 1947:70).

In this context, Khomyakov formulated the Slavophile criticism of the West: Catholicism was to him blind submission to authority, and Protestantism a picture of lonely individuals in an atomized society, and he suggested that the sole measure of truth was not the Pope or the Scriptures, but the extent of harmony that was achieved within the collective consciousness of the Church. The Western Church, having accepted a new dogma (the dogma of the filioque) without the consent of the Eastern Church, had undermined the moral conditions of knowledge and thus had succumbed to 'rationalism'. Rationalism is here understood as logical knowledge isolated from moral principles, while the attainment of true knowledge was to Khomyakov a common cognitive effort, illuminated by love.

Kireevsky, another major Slavophile writer, criticized with regard to the West its ancient Roman heritage, especially the rationalism of Roman law and jurisprudence¹², and its impact on the Western churches and the bureaucratic State, further the Enlightenment and industrialism, all leading to the 'Social Contract' which, according to him, was not an invention of the Encyclopedists but an ideal towards which all Western societies strive unconsciously. In ancient Russia, however, the basic social unit seemed to him to have been the village commune (*obshchina*) which was founded on the common use of land and governed by the *mir*, a council of elders. There was no social contract but solidarity and faith; in fact, all holy Russia was one great *mir*¹³, while in the West, he thought, private and social life are based on the concept of an individual and separate independence that presupposes the isolation of the individual.

Kireevsky opposed the Western trend towards formalization and the universality of knowledge, the democratic demand that truth should be the same for everyone, and he spoke of truths which are recognized only by concrete collective bodies. Moreover, he maintained that not all individuals possess the capacity for true understanding to the same degree. Kireevsky's epistemological elitism, – to use Walicki's words – placed at the apex of the spiritual hierarchy those who were illuminated by a superior light and an unusually strong faith. Such people, he wrote, owe their 'integral per-

¹² This as well as other Slavophile insights have later been corroborated by Max Weber who talked about the rationalism of Roman law and its profound impact on European history, e.g. the Western Churches and the bureaucratic State (*Economy and Society*, p. 828). On the other hand, there was indeed a relative lack of legal rationalism in the Orthodox tradition, for instance in the Church's approach to sin. Sinful acts were considered as manifestations of man's internal disease which can only be overcome by *theosis* (deification), while in the West Anselm taught that actual sins may be expiated by temporal punishment and that Redemption can be explained in terms of a legal transaction which leads to justification.

¹³ Kireevsky Vol. I, p. 192; *Obshchina*, in the technical sense, refers to the village commune as an economic unit, whereas *mir* refers to the social and judiciary aspect. In nontechnical literature, the two terms tend to be used interchangeably.

sonality' (*tseĭ'naya lichnost'*) and their integral reason – a harmonious unity of all psychic powers –, as opposed to logical reason which is shared by every man, regardless of his moral worth, to the organic ties binding them to the community and the Church or to a supra-individual consciousness. They are not isolated individuals who, because of a one-sided accent on rationalism, suffer from a disintegration of the psyche and of social bonds. Kireevsky formulated these ideas in conformity with the Orthodox tradition in which rational deductive methods, although they were not completely eliminated, have always represented the lowest and the least reliable level of theology¹⁴. Since Byzantine times, it was mystical *theoria* (contemplation) – which does not imply emotional individualism but rather a continuous communion with the Spirit that dwells in the whole Church – by which one attained the highest truth (Meyendorff 1975:9)

The populist movement (*narodnichestvo*) did not distinguish itself from the Slavophiles by new ideas on the historical differences between Russia and the West but rather by ideas on the future development of Russia (they advocated that Russia could by-pass the capitalist stage of development and idealized the self-sufficient peasant economy). Their most influential theorist, Mikhailovsky, rejected the division of labour and maintained that in tribal society, based on simple co-operation, man lives a primitive but full life, developing an integral personality (*tseĭstnaya lichnost'*), while the division of labour and social differentiation destroy the integral personality and turn men into specialized monofunctional organs of a larger whole. Individual progress and social evolution are therefore mutually exclusive; in fact, “progress is the gradual approach to the integral individual (*k tseĭstnosti nedelimykh*), the fullest possible and the most diversified division of labour among man's organs and the least possible division of labour among men” (Mikhailovsky 1896, Vol. I, p. 150).

It is true that Mikhailovsky also talked of a struggle for ‘individuality’ and that the simple social organization without impersonal mechanisms was to him simply a means to achieve more individuality, but Mikhailovsky's struggle for individuality had but little in common with modern individualism. While an individualistic aspect cannot be denied, as Mikhailovsky never abandoned the ideals of intellectual and moral autonomy and of the rational choice of common values, he stressed evoking Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, factual mutual independence and, at the same time, a “longing to be drowned in the mass of the people”, and a perception of oneness with

¹⁴ Besançon (1977) has, like others, insisted on the fact that the Slavophiles borrowed all their major ideas from Western Europe, and particularly from the German romantics, rather than from the Greek Fathers, as Kireevsky had stated. This observation is, however, much less surprising, if one keeps in mind the similarity in the historical circumstances, for the German romantics, like the Slavophiles in Russia after them, represented the reaction of a basically holistic society (Dumont 1991) to Western individualism.

the folk, the peasants, in the sense of *sobornost'*. This is quite different and, in fact, opposite to the modern situation where each person is very dependent on the material level, but where the ideology makes us believe that we are autonomous individuals. Mikhailovsky's model has sometimes been called a hybrid (Walicki 1979:263) because he idealized a precapitalist communal economy and at the same time insisted on the value of the human individual. However, this common interpretation neglects Mikhailovsky's distinction between the level of social development and the type of social development, his suggestion that Western society and its individualism have attained a higher level than Russia's, but that Russia's 'integral personality' in the peasant commune is of a higher type. It is perhaps possible to say that Mikhailovsky tried to place individualistic and holistic ideas within a hierarchical order.

Mikhailovsky's remarks on the uniqueness of the Russian word *pravda* – truth and justice designated by the same word – are revealing about the tension between individualism and holism in his own mind and in the Russia of his time. "I could never believe, he said, that it is forbidden to find a point of view in which *pravda* as truth (*pravda – istina*) and *pravda* as justice (*pravda – spravedlivost'*) could not go hand in hand, one enriching the other" (Billington 1958:34). Mikhailovsky is here trying to keep together what in the modern individualistic world has fallen apart. In 'Science as a Vocation' Max Weber reminded us that something can be sacred in so far as it is not beautiful (as in the fifty-third chapter of the book of Isaiah), and beautiful in so far as it is not good, as in Baudelaire's *Fleurs du Mal*; that it is in fact a commonplace today that something can be true although it is not beautiful and not holy and not good. While Socrates may have believed in the unity of knowledge and virtue or that true knowledge is the source of morality, modern man separates the True and the Good, science and morals, what is and what ought to be, judgements of fact and judgements of value, and he can do so only because he stresses the supremacy of the individual as a value, and because he finds morality exclusively within the individual's conscience instead of finding the Good within society as a whole. Mikhailovsky, in any case, was unwilling to accept this modern view.

The intellectual history of Russia in the nineteenth century may be described as a clash of its holistic cultural identity with the Western individualistic configuration¹⁵ and the almost desperate attempt to integrate the value of the individual which could not be completely denied, into the holistic view. The result among Slavophiles and Populists was a some-

¹⁵ The term individualistic configuration includes not only individualism but also its concomitants, as, for instance, liberty, equality, the separation of values and facts and the separation of knowledge into different disciplines.

times excessive holism, but also the concept of the “integral personality” which admitted aspects of Western individualism at a subordinate level.

It should at least be mentioned in passing that in the Russian literature of the same period both L. Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky condemned Western individualism and called for humility in the face of “the peoples’ truth” (Karataev in Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* and the critique of the Russian “wanderers” in Dostoyevsky’s *Address on Pushkin*), and Tolstoy taught that the division of labour in society should be replaced with the principle of the division of each individual’s daily work into different ‘harnesses’: each man should occupy himself, successively, with all kinds of labour, thus exercising all his capacities. The ‘integral personality’ comes to mind.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As has been shown with regard to traditional Orthodox society, the autonomous individual was not the norm of thought nor the bearer of value. Rather the bearer of value was the koinobion, the sobornost’, the obshchina, the mir, and the ‘integral personality’, and there could be found a relatively outworldly individualism and an individualism which was considered as the lower path to salvation. These all are constellations of individuals, empirically multiple but ideologically and ontologically one.

Although, after this short survey of the history of the place and regarding the kind of individualism in the Eastern Orthodox tradition one may be tempted to suggest that not states, but cultural and religious traditions are “thoughts of God” which outlast all political revolutions, the process of acculturation to the Western individualistic configuration became inevitable in the nineteenth century.

Marxism, which had made inroads in Russia almost solely among the deracinated intelligentsia and the proletariat of the cities, was of course a completely Western system of ideas, with sources in the Enlightenment and in the individualistic tradition. From its economic perspective, it did not proclaim collective ends apart from the ends of the individuals, as L. Dumont (1977) has shown.

Lenin embraced Marxism, but adapted it to an idea which had captivated the minds of the Russian intelligentsia since Chaadaev and Herzen and which more recently has been called the theorem of the privilege of backwardness, namely that it is possible for a backward culture to avoid the mistakes of other or more advanced cultures and to preserve earlier forms of social life which contain the germ of a future synthesis. Thus he led Russia directly from tsarism to socialism, trying to repress the individualism which had infiltrated into the country, by the principle of partiinost’ (party-mindedness) and thus imposing an artificial holism: a totalitarian regime and a totalitarian bureaucracy (Davydov 1995:163).

The process of adaptation of the Orthodox tradition to the Western individualistic configuration continues today, a complicated process which combines the traditional and the modern, and not a simple replacement of the old by the new. In this context it is perhaps useful to remember that the new inwardly individualism in Russia, while it may be accepted on the level of facts, has no basis in the Eastern Orthodox traditional ideology, except at an inferior level.

On the whole, however, it seems advisable to recognize the social relativity of the autonomous individual as a category of thought. Durkheim's formula of 'collective consciousness' may be questionable or mystifying from the point of view of an individualistic sociology, but it may be much easier to integrate it into modern sociology if one realizes that the Eastern Orthodox tradition has a lesson in store for sociology, the lesson that the *koinobion*, *sobornost'*, *obshchina* etc. can be societal values, related to the dominant ideology.

It is necessary, however, to be circumspect. While Eastern Orthodox concepts and ideas may provide data which a universal sociology can use to its advantage, and while the sociological study of Eastern Orthodoxy or a sociology of Orthodoxy may provide tools for a better understanding not only of the Orthodox tradition, but of society in general or even of Western society – subject, of course, to a translation of these concepts into the universal language of sociology –, there cannot be an Orthodox sociology. A proper study of any society is comparative, and even if one criticizes aspects of Western individualistic and sociocentric sociology, one does this by reference to one normative definition of the universal discipline and not in order to provoke a solipsistic retreat.

Bibliography

- Barker, Ernest (1957) *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*, Oxford, Clarendon
 Beck, H.-G. (1959) *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* München: C.H. Beck
 Bellah, Robert (1970) 'Religious Evolution' in: *Beyond Belief* New York: Harper & Row
 Benz, Ernst (1971) *Geist und Leben der Ostkirche* München: Fink
 Berman, Harold (1983) *Law and Revolution* Harvard University Press
 Besançon, Alain (1977) *Les origines intellectuelles du Léninisme* Paris: Calman-Lévy
 Billington, James (1958) *Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism* Oxford
 Conybeare, F. (1921) *Russian Dissenters* Harvard University Press
 Davydov, J. & P. Gaidenko (1995) *Russland und der Westen* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
 Dumont, Louis (1991) *L'idéologie allemande* Paris: Gallimard
 Dumont, Louis (1982) 'A modified view of our origins: the Christian beginnings of modern individualism' in: *Religion* 12, pp. 1-27
 Dumont, Louis (1977) *From Mandeville to Marx* University of Chicago Press
 Harnack, A. von (1991) *Dogmengeschichte* Tübingen: Mohr (1889)
 Heiler, F. (1971) *Die Ostkirchen* München: Ernst Reinhard
 Holl, Karl (1898) *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum* Leipzig
 Kartashov, A. (1925) 'Smysl staroobryadchestva' in: *Mélanges Pierre Struve*. Prague

- Kapterev, N.F. (1909-1912) Patriarkh Nikon i Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Sergiev Posad
 Kireevsky, I. (1911) Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 2 vols. Moscow
 Medlin, William (1952) Moscow and East Rome Genève: Droz
 Meyendorff, John (1981) Byzantium and the Rise of Russia Cambridge University Press
 Meyendorff, John (1975) Byzantine Theology London & Oxford: Mowbrays
 Mikhailovsky, N.K. (1896) Sochineniya Mikhailovskogo St. Petersburg
 Nitsche, Peter (1991) Nicht an die Griechen glaube ich, sondern an Christus. Russen
 und Griechen im Selbstverständnis des Moskauer Staates. Düsseldorf: Droste
 Ostrogorsky, G. (1968) History of the Byzantine State Oxford: Blackwell (1940)
 Palmer, William (1871) The Patriarch and the Tsar London: Trübner
 Pipes, Richard (1974) Russia under the Old Regime New York: Scribner's
 Schelting, A. von (1948) Russland und Europa im russischen Geschichtsdenken Bern
 Smolitsch, I. (1953) Russisches Mönchtum Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag
 Soloviev, V. (1947) Crise de la philosophie occidentale Paris: Aubier
 Svoronos, N.G. (1951) 'Le serment de fidélité à l'empereur byzantin' Revue d'études
 byzantines vol. 9, pp. 106-142
 Troeltsch, Ernst (1960) The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches New York (1912)
 Walicki, A. (1979) A History of Russian Thought Stanford University Press
 Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society University of California Press
 Zenkovsky, Serge A. (1970) Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo München: Fink

Андреас Бус, Отава (Канада)

СОЦИОЛОГИЈА ПРАВОСЛАВНЕ ТРАДИЦИЈЕ

Резиме

Модерна социологија је у великој мери социологија која посматра друштво као нешто састављено од аутономних појединаца. Ипак, као што је Луи Димон (Dumont) показао, модерни (овоземаљски) индивидуализам је последица трансформације, углавном подстакнуте односом између цркве и државе који се мењао од осмог века, оноземаљског индивидуализма раног хришћанства.

Овај рад се бави питањем о томе да ли се слична трансформација десила и у источноправославној традицији. Истражују се рани монахизам и однос између цркве и државе у Византији и Русији, и даље код руских староверника, славенофила и популиста. Истрагом се закључује да је источно православље остало традиција холизма и оноземаљског индивидуализма, „интегралне личности“ и индивидуализма као нижег пута ка спасењу. Модерни индивидуализам нема културну основу у овој традицији. Социологија православне традиције би стога могла да подари нове концепте или алате универзалној социологији.

Кључне речи: овоземаљски индивидуализам, оноземаљски индивидуализам, коинобион, саборност, обштина.