CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY

Jasmina Labudović Stankovic

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME241114047L
First page
707
Last page
720

Abstract


The central bank can utilise transparency to effectively implement monetary policy and enhance efficiency. People who are interested in the decisions and activities of the central bank could alter their actions due to increased transparency. Transparency aims to eliminate the imbalance of information between the central bank and recipients of its decisions, allowing market participants to make well-informed judgements. Globalisation, inflation targeting, central bank independence, and financial market liberalisation have led to a higher need for transparency. The central bank’s credibility and reputation are upheld through transparency, which helps to maintain trust in the institution. Transparency elements at various decision-making phases involve sharing particular information containing appropriate content. They provide a detailed explanation of the central bank’s decision-making process and actions when carrying out monetary policy. While the central bank must be transparent to serve public interests and demonstrate socially responsible behaviour, such transparency has its limits. The public cannot anticipate every single piece of information to be published. Excessive transparency can negatively impact the central bank’s interests.


Keywords

transparency, information asymmetry, communication, central bank.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME241114047L

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